Study On Double Principal-Agent Risk Control Of Expressway PPP Industry Fund

At present,highway PPP projects rely on traditional financing channels to raise funds,which leads to problems such as difficulty in financing and low signing rate.As an innovative financing model,the highway PPP industry fund attracts more social capital participation through structured design,which is an important way to resolve the financing dilemma of expressway PPP projects.However,the highway PPP industry fund will have a double principal-agent relationship in the operation process.Due to the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent and the inconsistent interest objectives,a series of principalagent risks will be triggered,resulting in the highway PPP industry fund operates inefficiently.Therefore,how to design an effective incentive and restraint mechanism to avoid the abovementioned risks is the foothold of this paper.This paper takes the highway PPP industry fund as the research object,and takes the principal-agent theory,game theory and incentive mechanism design as the theoretical basis,and comprehensively applies various research methods such as literature research,game theory analysis and model analysis.Research on risk control of highway PPP industry funds.Firstly,on the basis of the inductive analysis of the operation mode of expressway PPP industry fund,the dual principal-agent relationship of expressway PPP industry fund is identified.The first principal-agent relationship occurs between the investor and the fund manager.The double principal-agent relationship takes place between the fund manager and the project company.Secondly,relying on the double principal-agent relationship to analyze the double principalagent risk of the expressway PPP industry fund,both will have dual adverse selection and dual moral hazard,and analyze and demonstrate its risk by means of game theory tools.Thirdly,based on the incentive compatibility theory,a dual principal-agent model is established to analyze the incentive problem of the agent under the information asymmetry and linear payment contract.And the influencing factors of the agent's optimal effort and the optimal compensation payment ratio are obtained.Finally,according to the revelation obtained in the previous chapter,this paper designs an effective incentive and restraint mechanism to prevent the double principal-agent risk of the highway PPP industry fund.The research shows that in the first principal-agent risk,the information screening model(remuneration design)is used to prevent investors from adverse selection,and the equity incentives,reputation incentives and limited partnerships are used to prevent the moral hazard of fund managers;in the second principal-agent risk,the fund manager's adverse selection problem is solved by establishing a game model between the fund manager and the project company,and the moral hazard of the project company management personnel is prevented through stock options,acquisition control and phased capital injection.