Research On Cross-border RMB Loans-Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Since 2009,the country has steadily pushed forward the internationalization of the RMB.With the expansion of the scale of China’s trade exports,the increase in the stock of overseas RMB funds has resulted in the demand for the reflux of RMB.Inside and outside the circulation of RMB funds smooth mechanism is the only way which must be passed the internationalization of the RMB cross-border RMB loans,cross-border RMB business as important one,is an important push to build overseas RMB funds back to the channel,so it is necessary to develop cross-border RMB loan business.In addition,the RMB interest rate in overseas financial market is lower than that in the domestic market.The difference between domestic and foreign interest rates provides space for the development of cross-border RMB loans,brings new business opportunities for commercial banks,and also opens up new financing paths for businesses,especially small and medium-sized enterprises.In this paper,through the collation of previous studies found that the consolidation theory of cross-border lending to the current academic circles of cross-border RMB loans isinfrequent,mostly in support of laws and regulations and put forward suggestions from the national policy,there are few papers from the bank and the enterprise micro level research,and therefore will not be put forward more targeted and operational policy suggestions.Through analyzing the current situation,policy and loan mode of cross border RMB loan in various pilot areas,we find that cross-border RMB loan business is still facing many shortcomings.For example,the current cross-border RMB loan is one way,only from overseas back home,small and medium enterprises are still facing difficulties in applying for credit.For the existence of cross-border commercial bank loans problems,internal decision-making mechanism in-depth study of cross-border RMB loans in commercial banks,inspired by the Hotelling model,with the help of evolutionary game theory,on the basis of the Hotelling model to construct the model of the current bilateral loans China cross-border lending pilot area of foreign banks and domestic banks and,on both sides of the strategy choices made dynamic stability analysis,and the numerical relationship demonstrates different values of the parameters of the initial conditions and changes and system evolution results.The results show that the pattern of cross-border RMB loans choice evolution system of foreign and domestic banks to meet certain conditions in the interest rate,cost,information loss and loss parameters such as distance regulation,converge to two modes,one for both banks out of competition state,a state of cooperation between the two sides.By adjusting the parameters such as information utility loss and intermediate cost,the system can exit the competitive state and promote the evolution of both banks in the direction of cooperation.Finally,this article on the analysis results of the evolutionary game theory of cross-border RMB loan business based on the promotion of cross-border RMB loans to meet the conditions,combined with the current market environment and the bank management experience,and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions on the construction of interest rate mechanism,information construction and mode of cooperation,to further promote the development of cross-border RMB loans.