A Game Simulation Study On The Loan Risk Compensation Mechanism Of Technology-based Small And Medium-sized Enterprises

In the process of continuous development of economy and technology in China,the status of SMEs is becoming more and more prominent.The development of SMEs is related to the improvement of comprehensive strength and the progress of scientific and technological innovation.But because of some SMEs of their own limitations,resulting in its financing difficulties.This not only affects the economic development of our country,but also causes the lag in technological progress.Based on the loan risk compensation mechanism,combined with the benefits and costs of the government,banks,and SMEs in the process of implementing the mechanism,this paper establishes banks and government evolutionary game model,banks and SMEs evolutionary game model and banks,government and SMEs cooperative game model based on the theory of evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory.This paper analyzes the local stability of the evolutionary game model,simulates the evolution process,proposes suggestions for the game process.The paper also gives three methods of cooperative game model: core,Shapley value and Shapley value based on risk adjustment,in order to design a reasonable income distribution mechanism and realize the Pareto improvement of the overall social welfare.SMEs as the main force of technological innovation,it is also facing the risk of technological innovation.In order to promote its development,reduce the risk of technological innovation,the government specifically developed risk compensation mechanism for its.The first part of this article is the introduction,first of all expounding the research background and significance.The current situation at home and abroad was studied from the two dimensions of loan risk compensation mechanism and loan subsidy.Then introduced the research content and research ideas of this article.The second part is a theoretical study based on SMEs and loan risk compensation system.This section first elaborated the connotation of SMEs and technological innovation,analyzes the quasi-public product characteristics of technological innovation,and defines the meaning of technological innovation risks.The risk compensation mechanism was introduced from the two dimensions of direct compensation and indirect compensation,and the bank loan risk compensation mechanism was specifically introduced.The third part,by analyzing the revenue and costs between the government and the bank,a payment matrix for the game between the government and the banks is established.The evolutionary game theory is used to construct the copy dynamic equations,and the local stability analysis is carried out to obtain the ESS of the whole process and the key factors affecting the evolution direction.A simulation analysis of the evolutionary game between the government and the bank is conducted,and the evolutionary process of the evolutionary stability strategy and the instability strategy are described.Some suggestions were made to promote more stable cooperation between government and banks.The fourth part,through the analysis of the benefits and costs between banks and SMEs,a payment matrix for the game between the SMEs and the banks is established.The evolutionary game theory is used to construct the copy dynamic equations,and the local stability analysis is carried out to obtain the evolutionary stability strategy of the whole process and the key factors affecting the evolution direction.It also conducts simulation analysis of the evolutionary game between banks and SMEs,and describes the evolutionary process of evolutionary stability strategy and instability strategy.Some suggestions were made to promote more stable cooperation between the SMEs and the banks.The fifth part,on the premise of group rationality,using cooperative game theory,a trilateral cooperation game model consisting of SMEs,banks and government was established.Three distributions of alliance earnings are given: core,Shapley value,and Shapley value based on risk adjustment.The numerical method was used to calculate the distribution of the union income under these three methods,and the three distribution schemes were analyzed and compared.The sixth part,the paper summarizes the full text and proposes optimization strategies for the promotion of SMEs loans from three different levels: government,banks and SMEs.