Evolutionary Game Study On Green Construction Supervision Based On System Dynamics

Green construction is an important means and inevitable requirement for the sustainable development of the construction industry,and the supervision.of the relevant government departments on construction enterprises is the key link in the implementation of green construction policies.In this study,evolutionary game theory is introduced to analyze the game of green construction supervision.At the same time,combined with the method of system dynamics simulation,the numerical simulation of strategy evolution process in the game bureau is conducted to find the way to optimize the regulatory strategy,which provides the theoretical basis for the policy making and strategy selection of regulatory agencies.The main work of this study is as follows.First of all,based on the status quo of green construction and supervision,this study analyzes the game relationship between construction enterprises and regulatory authorities,determines the external variables involved in the game model,calculates the payment function of the players in different situations,and constructs the game between construction enterprises and regulatory authorities.The classical replicator dynamic equation is introduced to establish the evolutionary game model.According to the logical relations in the replicator's dynamic equation,the system dynamics model of the game is drawn,and the logical relationship between the external variables in the model is analyzed and assigned reasonably.On the basis of this model,the sensitivity analysis of external variables is carried out by using Vensim simulation software to find the external variables that have the highest sensitivity to green construction in construction enterprises.The results of simulation and analysis show that raising the total penalty for non-green construction in construction enterprises and reducing the incremental cost of green construction can effectively improve the green construction probability in a short period of time.Secondly,based on the replicator's dynamic equation,this study solves the equilibrium point of evolutionary game system.Based on the Jacobin matrix and other nonlinear system analysis methods,the stability of the equilibrium point of the game is analyzed.The Vensim simulation software is used to simulate the evolution process of the game.When the game reaches an equilibrium state,the stability of the equilibrium point is verified by simulating the"catastrophe" situation.The theoretical analysis and simulation results show that under the static supervision strategy,the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game is not stable.Under the dynamic punishment strategy,the equilibrium point of the hybrid strategy in the evolutionary game is stable.Increasing the oversight responsibility of regulators and reducing the regulatory costs can improve the green construction probability of construction enterprises under the stable mixed strategy.Thirdly,based on the unilateral stability analysis of the players,this study explores the inner mechanism of the players evolution strategy.Based on this,the influence of regulatory probability threshold on the probability stability of green construction in construction enterprises is studied.The theoretical analysis and simulation results show that when regulatory authorities set the regulatory probability threshold and maintain the regulatory probability above the threshold,the green construction probability can be raised to 100%and maintained stable.Finally,taking Hangzhou as an example,this paper analyzes the supervision and enforcement of green construction by using the evolutionary game model and system dynamics model constructed in this study,and puts forward suggestions on the green construction supervision.