Research On The Development Of Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance In Gansu Province Based On Multi-Agent Game

Since the 21 st century,we have noticed a dramatic increase in the frequency of sudden environmental pollution accidents in China.Along with the rapid economic development,the environmental pollution problems is getting worse,and causing a series of social problems such as ecological damage and legal disputes.China has promoted the environmental pollution liability insurance(" environmental liability insurance ")policy vigorously and enhanced the environmental governance through market means to strengthen the environmental management,maintain social stability,and protect the ecosystem health.Since the implementation of "environmental liability insurance" in 1991,China has carried out three pilot projects.There have been a series of problems during the pilot projects,such as backward product design,low enthusiasm for insurance,poor compensation effect,imperfect factual basis and so on.In recent decades,domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a large number of studies,however,there are still many problems that haven’t been solved.Therefore,that it is of great significance to continue to explore and study the existing problems in the development of environmental liability insurance.This paper takes Gansu province as an example to study based on the consideration of regional differences.This paper analyzes the "environmental liability insurance" and its existing problems in Gansu province.From the perspective of multi-game,constructs a dynamic game model among insurance companies,polluting enterprises,governments,the public and other multi-stakeholders.Analyzing the inter-restrictive mechanism of the behaviors of market subjects.To explore the internal reasons that restrict the development of environmental liability insurance in Gansu Province,and puts forward specific solutions.In the first part of the article,at first,introduces the background and significance of this study,and summarizes the relevant literature research results at home and abroad.In addition,it briefly introduces the research ideas and methods of this paper.In the second part,firstiy,elaborates the definition,connotation,characteristics and function in environmental pollution control of "environmental liability insurance";secondly,it analyses and introduces the public goods theory,externality theory,welfare economics theory and other related basic theories;finally,it elaborates the relevant basic theory of game theory.The third part is the current situation of Gansu’s environmental and the development of "environmental liability insurance",and analyses the problems in the developing process of "environmental liability insurance" in Gansu Province.The fourth part is the dynamic game analysis of multi-agents in the "environmental liability insurance" market.four dynamic game models are introduced by using the game theory analysis method,which are: the dynamic game model with the participation of polluting enterprises and insurance companies,polluting enterprises and government,polluting enterprises and the public,and the dynamic game model with the participation of polluting enterprises,insurance companies and government.Analyzing the inter-restrictive mechanism of the behaviors of market subjects.The fifth part puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to further optimize the development of “environmental liability insurance” in Gansu Province based on the above analysis and conclusions.