Research On Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Mode In China Based On Multi-subject Game

Since the 21st century,environmental pollution accidents have occurred frequently,how to carry out effective prevention and control of environmental pollution is the urgent need of China in the new industrialization green low-carbon development stage.As an effective means of environmental pollution prevention and control,the development and application of environmental pollution liability insurance in foreign countries has been very mature,and China has experienced more than 30 years of exploration and development since its introduction in the 1990 s,but still faces many difficulties such as weak institutional protection,low enthusiasm of enterprises to insure,and low willingness of insurance companies to underwrite.Therefore,it is important to explore a better environmental pollution liability insurance model than the previous one for the green development of China's economy and society.This paper is based on this research.Firstly,the three stages of the pilot development of environmental pollution liability insurance are systematically sorted out,and the typical models in the pilot development process are introduced,and then the valuable experience and shortcomings in the development process are summarized;then,the game analysis of the participating subjects of environmental pollution liability insurance is carried out.Then,we analyze the game of environmental pollution liability insurance,which includes the government,enterprises and insurance companies,including the static game of complete information between government and enterprises,insurance companies and enterprises,and the dynamic game of incomplete information between the three.It is found that: firstly,the environmental pollution management under the compulsory mode of environmental pollution liability insurance is more effective than the voluntary mode,and the provinces and cities with better environmental pollution liability insurance pilot work have administrative or legal compulsory protection;secondly,when the government adopts no compulsory supervision to take out insurance,most enterprises will only take out insurance when they face high accident outbreak rate in order to maximize their interests,and when the government adopts compulsory supervision to take out insurance,some enterprises with high risk preference will still take out insurance.Third,the government prefers to take compulsory insurance regulatory measures for enterprises with high environmental pollution risks,but insurance companies have a low willingness to underwrite insurance for this type of enterprises,and the government can improve their enthusiasm for underwriting if they provide financial support to insurance companies;fourth,enterprises' own risk prevention and control system is not perfect,which will reduce the willingness of insurance companies and increase the cost of government regulation.Fourth,the imperfect risk prevention and control system of the enterprises themselves will reduce the willingness of insurance companies to insure and increase the cost of government supervision and pollution control.In view of this,this study takes the construction of ecological civilization as the entry point,proposes to develop a mandatory model of environmental pollution liability insurance with minimum limits and floating rates,and makes a preliminary design for the specific contents of the model.Finally,combining the development experience of environmental pollution liability insurance in China,the game conclusion and its verification analysis,the study proposes a guarantee strategy for the operation of this model from four perspectives: policy protection,collaborative governance,market operation,and risk prevention and control.