Research On The Imported B2C E-commerce Credit Problem Based On Game Theory

In recent years,the import of e-commerce has developed rapidly,and the import of e-commerce "cross-trade" and "electricity" consumption has combined import trade with consumption.Imported e-commerce as an emerging model of import trade not only reduces the transaction costs of enterprises and increases the opportunities for import trade transactions,and improves the efficiency of transactions,but also greatly stimulates domestic consumption.But the imported e-commerce due to its virtual nature leads to transactions.The subject has great information asymmetry,which is also the reason for the prominent credit risk problem and the frequent fraudulent transactions in the imported e-commerce market.Thispaper introduces the game theory analysis method to study the imported B2C e-commerce credit problem,which not only provides theoretical research foundation for the research of imported e-commerce credit problem,but also provides targeted suggestions on how to reduce the imported B2C e-commerce credit risk.This paper analyzes the game between consumers,platforms and merchants involved in the construction of credit system.Firstly,it analyzes the complete information static game between the buyer and the seller under the condition of no introduction of the third-party platform supervision,the gain obtained by the seller's fraudulent operation affects the Nash equilibrium result of the game between the two parties.After the introduction of third-party platform supervision,after long-term repeated game between buyers and sellers,rational merchants will pay more attention to long-term interests and choose honest management.Increasing the supervision and punishment of the platform and providing a more effective credit evaluation system for information transmission can improve the trust between the two parties and facilitate the smooth progress of the transactions between the two parties.Both buyers and sellers will choose the integrity management strategy and trust strategy after repeated games.The static game analysis of the complete information between the platform and overseas sellers,we find the probability that the seller chooses the strategy of honest management is positively related to the supervision,margin and punishment of the platform.Then,considering that the subject of the game is bounded rational,the evolutionary game analysis model is introduced when theplatform supervision results are uncertain.Through long-term repeated evolutionary games between merchants and platforms,merchants and platforms will imitate each other and learn from each other.They will adjust their strategies according to each other's strategies and eventually reach an evolutionary stability strategy solution(ESS).According to the Jacobi matrix,the stability of the five equilibrium points is analyzed,and the game process reaches equilibrium state under four different situations.Finally,based on the analysis of the game results,we provide suggestions on how to reduce the credit risk of imported B2C e-commerce.This paper introduces the game theory analysis method to analyze the credit problems existing in the imported B2C e-commerce transaction,which helps to discover the source of credit risk,and provides a basis for optimizing the research of imported B2C e-commerce transaction credit content,in order to further promote the import of B2C electronics.We make some reasonable suggestions for further promoting the development of imported B2C e-commerce.