Study On Supply Chain Coordination And Income Distribution Mechanism Of Inner Mongolia Coal-Fired Power Enterprises

As a major coal production base in China,Inner Mongolia is recognized as an important energy base of the country,relying on its abundant resources and superior geographical advantages.However,at present,there are some certain problems in the development of the thermal power generation industry in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.Among them,the coordinated development of various links in the coal-fired power supply chain is always being the key factor to affecting the basic pattern of energy supply as well as the demand and the comprehensive balanced energy situation in the region.Currently,even though the autonomous regional government actively promotes the integration of coal and electricity,the construction of the pit power station,and encourages the signing of long-term coal agreements,which are conducive to the coordination of supply chain coordination of coal-fired power enterprises in Inner Mongolia,it is still not possible to fundamentally coordinate the contradiction between coal-fired power companies.The actual dispute between coal and electricity in Inner Mongolia is the distribution of income from coal-fired power companies and the default of thermal coal contracts.How to rationally distribute the interests among the members of the coal supply chain and constrain the behavior of the supply chain members in the context of the deepening of the market reform of the coal market is the key point of coal power supply chain coordination,which is also the key to protect coal production enterprises and power generation enterprises and the overall development of the coal power supply chain.First of all,this paper analyzes the current situation of supply chain coordination in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and finds its existing problems.By constructing a game model,a credit penalty mechanism model,a grid subsidy model;analyze the coal-electricity enterprise income distribution,contract-to-current constraints,and grid subsidy decisions.Secondly,according to the relevant data of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises,the parameters are assigned and simulated by this paper,and the relevant analysis results are obtained.The results show that:(1)From the simulation results of the income distribution of coal-fired enterprises in Inner Mongolia,the coal-fired enterprises jointly,the coal enterprise income and the coal-fired supply chain as a whole is higher than the non-joined income.The income of power companies is lower than that of non-joint ventures.The overall income of the supply chain of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises is higher than that of non-joint ventures.The trend is that as the altruistic factor increases,the total income increases first and then decreases.Therefore,in order to achieve the purpose of coal power supply chain coordination,the income of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises needs to be distributed twice.According to the joint venture,the overall income of coal enterprises,power companies and supply chains should be greater than the income under the non-joint ventures,and the range of the second-income distribution coefficient should be determined.Thereby achieving the goal of a win-win situation for all subjects in the coal power supply chain.(2)From the simulation results of the long-term contractual credit mechanism of Inner Mongolia coal-fired power enterprises,in the case of the out-of-stock cost penalty mechanism,the increase of the out-of-stock cost coefficient will promote the improvement of the performance rate of the thermal coal contract,and the increase of the altruistic coefficient will The performance of the thermal coal contract will increase first and then decrease.In the case of the income penalty mechanism,the increase of the income penalty coefficient will promote the improvement of the fulfillment rate of the thermal coal contract,and the increase of the altruistic coefficient will reduce the fulfillment rate of the thermal coal contract.(3)Judging from the simulation results of grid company subsidies,with the increase of coal price,the subsidy price of grid companies,the on-grid tariff and subsidy coefficient after subsidies have all increased.In addition,the degree of integration of coal-fired power enterprises in Inner Mongolia,the corresponding subsidies for power grids are also different,which can be describe as the higher the degree of integration,the lower the grid subsidies.Therefore,when power grid companies subsidize power companies,they should first determine the degree of integration and make more reasonable subsidy decisions.Finally,based on the empirical analysis and simulation results analysis,the supply chain coordination proposals are proposed from the perspective of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Government and Inner Mongolia Coal and Electricity Enterprises.