| The situation of environmental problems in China is serious.It is extremely urgent to carry out environmental regulations.As an important part of environmental regulation,the Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR)system has become a mature management mode for heavy pollution industries in developed countries or regions.In 2017,the “Implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility System”issued by China's State Council clearly pointed out that the EPR system should be fully implemented in four major industries of high consumption,high emission and high pollution,such as electrical and electronic industries.It also requires that the environmental protection responsibility of production enterprises should be extended to the whole life cycle of products.Although the full implementation of EPR system demonstrates China's firm attitude toward strengthening environmental regulations and taking a high-quality development road,the frequent corruption cases of environmental protection system reflect the serious problem of environmental regulation capture in China.Based on the background of China's comprehensive promotion and implementation of EPR system,this paper intends to analyze the serious capture problem and the underlying causes of environmental regulations in China,reveal the multi-party game behavior in the process of environmental regulation promotion,so as to encourage enterprises to formulate environmental strategies to meet the needs of ecological civilization construction,and coordinately improve environmental performance and economic performance.Therefore,it firstly elaborates the reasons and significance of this topic from two aspects of realistic background and academic doubts.Secondly,based on stakeholder theory and principal-agent theory,it explores the interaction between various stakeholders and the relationship of interesttransmission through the selection of environmental regulation capture cases in Bobai County,Guangxi Province.In addition,in order to promote the implementation of EPR system,it builds a three-party game model of government departments,enterprises and the public based on non-cooperative evolutionary game theory,and uses the system dynamics method to carry out strategy simulation analysis of the game model.Finally,based on 208 valid questionnaire data,the structural equation model is used to explore the interaction among environmental regulation,environmental strategy and corporate performance.The research finds that: firstly,there is a complex network of interaction and benefit transmission behind the environmental regulation capture,and individual capture can easily develop into collective capture.Enterprises and environmental regulatory authorities are in the position of structural holes in the capture network and play the leading role of capture behavior.The intermediary plays the role of“bridge”,and its motive is to provide help for the core subject and gain benefits.Stakeholders in the marginal structure have the motive to attract more subjects to join the network and profit from it.Secondly,the process of promoting the implementation of EPR system involves the tripartite dynamic game between government departments,enterprises and the public.The benefits and economic subsidies of strong regulations by government departments help to ease the conflicts between players,while fines and rectification costs have uncertain effects on game behavior.While financial compensation has a positive impact on easing the conflict among the three sides of this game,but the impact of administrative fine is negative,meanwhile,the impact of system acceptance cost has uncertainty.And their impact on enterprises is lagging behind.The net benefits of public supervision under different environmental regulations have completely opposite effects on the game process.Thirdly,under the background of EPR system,environmental regulation affects corporate comprehensive performance through the impact of corporateenvironmental strategy.Both environmental regulation have positive impact on both environmental strategies,but the positive impact of command-and-control environmental regulation on proactive environmental strategy is not significant.Both environmental strategies have positive impact on EPR enterprise's environmental performance and economic performance,but the positive impact of reactive environmental strategy on EPR enterprise's environmental performance is not significant.Major contributions: firstly,taking the environmental regulation capture case of Bobai County Environmental Protection Bureau of Guangxi Province as an example,it uses social network analysis method to quantify and visualize the hidden behavior interaction characteristics and interest delivery structure,reveals the position and role of various stakeholders in the relationship network,and clarifies the mechanism and causes of relevant environmental regulation capture events.Secondly,it clarifies the influencing factors and process mechanism of promoting the implementation of EPR system,and brings government departments,enterprises and the public into a unified research framework,breaking the limitation of previous studies that pay more attention to the game between the two sides.Thirdly,it develops a new measurement scale for enterprises implementing EPR system and reveals the transmission mechanism of environmental regulation affecting environmental strategy and comprehensive performance.Meanwhile,decision-making reference and behavior guidance are put forward from the perspective of environmental regulation authorities,production enterprises,residents and social organizations. |
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