Study On The Compensation Mechanism Of Quasi Public Welfare Water Conservancy PPP Project Based On Game Between Public And Private Sector Interests

The construction of water conservancy projects is related to the national economy and the people’s livelihood and is the infrastructure for national economic and social development.The government has introduced a series of policies to encourage and guide social capital to participate in the construction and operation management of quasi public welfare water conservancy projects.As the quasi public welfare water conservancy projects have the characteristics of long construction period,large investment funds and low investment returns,the government has not provided reasonable compensation to lead social capital to participate in the quasi public welfare water conservancy PPP.The enthusiasm of the project is not high.In order to resolve the contradictions between the different interests of the public and private parties,the government needs to meet the economic benefits of social capital and achieve the balance of their respective interests while considering the social benefits.Therefore,the government should make compensation strategies to deeply excavate the benefit game mechanism between the government and the social investors,through the design of both incentive and restrictive compensation mechanism,fully mobilize the investment enthusiasm of social investors,maximize the guidance and play the role of financial funds to achieve a win-win situation between public and private.First of all,from the quasi public welfare water PPP model,stakeholder,game theory,externality theory and compensation related theory,the theoretical framework of the compensation mechanism for the quasi public welfare water conservancy PPP project is constructed.From the theoretical analysis,it is concluded that the main body of the quasi public welfare water compensation is the government and the public sector,and the compensation object is the social capital and the private sector,and the compensation mode of financial investment and operation subsidy can be adopted.Secondly,using the method of literature review and expert interview to identify the factors of public and private benefits of public welfare water conservancy PPP project,to obtain the data required by the questionnaire,and to classify the factors by factor analysis.The purpose is to identify the key factors that affect the revenue and extract the income factors of the public welfare water conservancy PPP project,so as to provide a basis for the construction of the revenue model.Then,on the basis of considering the key factors of the impact of income,a profit model of the quasi public welfare water conservancy PPP project is constructed,which provides the basis for the compensation model of public and private interests.The compensation mode combined with the financial investment compensation and the operation subsidy is put forward and discussed.By using the induction mechanism and incentive thought of the Stackleberg game model,this paper analyzes how the government makes the compensation strategy and guides the private sector investment government to expect the optimal investment amount of its investment,and realizes the government’s own income and social benefits at the same time.Maximizing the sum and maximizing the profit of private sector investment,and achieving the breakeven of the private sector as early as possible.Finally,through the analysis of the necessity and feasibility of the compensation for the PPP project of public welfare water conservancy,and the analysis of the main factors of the compensation principle and the compensation.Based on the game compensation model of public and private interests,this paper aims at the design of PPP project compensation scheme for public welfare water conservancy projects,and puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the PPP project of quasi public welfare water conservancy.The compensation decision model of public interest game is verified by the Feng Sheng reservoir in Pengshui.