Pricing And Quality Strategies Of Freight Platform Based On Two-Sided Market Theory

In recent years,with the gradual deepening of Internet social development,The business mode of "Internet +" has gradually penetrated into all walks of life.In particular,many traditional industries have begun to use the network platform for efficient resource matching,which also creates opportunities for the transformation and upgrading of the highway freight industry.The emergence of freight platform solves the problem that trucks and goods cannot be matched in time because of asymmetric information,and brings great opportunities for the development of freight market.However,in order to achieve high profits,the difficulty that freight platform faces is the research of pricing and service quality strategy.In this context,this paper studies the highway freight platform pricing and service problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition,specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the freight market.the utility function model of truck owners and cargo owners are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition.For monopolistic market,the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming methods.For duopoly competition market,based on the non-cooperative game theory,this paper establishes a game model between two freight platforms and finds a pure Nash equilibrium strategy.In order to reveal the influence of the main parameter changes in the freight market on platform decision-making and equilibrium,this paper also carried out a series of sensitivity analyses and numerical simulation.The research results of this paper show that for the freight two-sided market which is almost monopolized by one platform,when the service cost parameter is large,the platform will provide a low service quality and low registration prices.However,when the cost parameter is small,the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices.Furthermore,in terms of price structure,the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity.For duopoly competition market,we can get the competitive equilibrium prices under a certain condition.The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.