Research On The Tripartite Game Of New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers-Consumers-Government

With the rapid development of China’s economy,the expansion of the city’s scale and the increasing living standards of the people,the demand for cars for residents has been increasing.At the same time,the development of new energy vehicles(NEV)has become the consensus of the government and the industry in order to make our country from a big auto country to a strong auto country.Therefore,from the perspective of game,this paper analyzes the behavioral characteristics of automobile manufacturers,consumers and government in the new energy vehicle market,and discuss the manufacturer’s optimal production-price decisions,consumer purchasing decisions,and government best practices under the purchase subsidy and dual-score policy.The main contents are as follows:The paper firstly introduce the research background and the research status at home and abroad,analyze the problems and challenges,developments and opportunities faced by NEV,and the new energy vehicle purchase subsidies,dual-score policy,consumer utility theory and game theory related to research are introduced to provide theoretical basis for follow-up research.Secondly,under the government’s purchase subsidy and dual-score policy,the manufacturer’s point income and car sales revenue are considered comprehensively,and the total profit model of the manufacturer is established.Taking the profit maximization as the criterion,the manufacturer’s optimal production pricing decision is obtained.By comparing the optimal production,pricing and income of the manufacturers before and after the government adopts the subsidy and dual-score policy,the relationship between the production,pricing and income of the manufacturer and subsidies and dual-score policy is theoretically analyzed.Thirdly,at the retail price of fuel cars and NEV developed by the manufacturer,establish a cost model for consumers to choose fuel cars or NEV by considering the government’s purchase subsidies for NEV and subsequent expenditures on vehicle operation and maintenance.According to the consumer’s valuation of the car,the net utility of the consumer’s choice of fuel car and new energy car is obtained;on this basis,according to the net utility,the consumer makes a purchase decision.Fourthly,according to the total income of the manufacturer and the total utility of the consumers in the automobile market,the government subsidy expenditure and the charging infrastructure construction cost are considered,and the social welfare function is obtained.With the goal of maximizing social welfare,the government sets the best purchase subsidy standards and the scoring efficiency of fuel vehicles and NEV.Finally,through the numerical simulation of the production-price decision of the manufacturer,the cost of the consumer’s choice of fuel vehicles or NEV,and total government expenditure and social welfare,the impact of the subsidy and dual-score policy on these three is further analyzed.Relevant suggestions were given to manufacturers’ production pricing and government policy formulation.