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Research On The Incentive Effect Of China's New Energy Vehicle Subsidies On Consumers

Posted on:2019-02-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2382330572964527Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the context of the shortage of natural resources and serious environmental pollution,countries around the world are paying more and more attention to the development of new energy vehicles.The Chinese government has issued a number of supportive policies and measures,which have played a positive role in the development of new energy vehicles.However,there are still some weak links.There is an imbalance between huge financial subsidies and sales of new energy vehicles.Subsidies are purchased for consumers.The effect of the selection is not obvious.In view of this,this paper intends to conduct an in-depth study on the subsidy policy of new energy vehicles,systematically analyze the impact of China's subsidy policy on consumer incentives,and discuss its subsidy effect.Based on China's new energy vehicle subsidy policy,this paper analyzes the necessity of government subsidy policy through evolutionary game theory.At the same time,based on the evolutionary game,it establishes a mathematical model of minimizing consumer expenditure,and analyzes the government's subsidy policy for consumers.The different effects of the purchase choice.First of all,the overall combing policy of China's new energy vehicles subsidies,highlighting the government support policy measures directly related to consumers,and then using actual data to illustrate the effect of subsidy policies;secondly,using evolutionary games to analyze the government and consumers Different selection behaviors,discussing the system equilibrium state under different choice behaviors of the two sides of the game,the analysis shows that the optimal long-term equilibrium state is the state in which consumers will choose new energy vehicles and the government will not give subsidies,and at the same time,it is concluded that this state is reached.The government needs to subsidize the new energy auto industry;then further analyze the government subsidies for new energy vehicle buyers,which subsidies should be chosen and their subsidies.Establishing a mathematical model that minimizes consumer spending,and analyzes the incentive effect of new energy vehicle purchase subsidies and related supporting facilities subsidies on consumer purchases.The research results have certain reference significance for the formulation of China's new energy vehicle policy.Finally,summarize the research content of the thesis,and use the conclusions of the research to put forward the rationalization opinions and suggestions for improving the subsidy policy of new energy vehicles in China.Through research,this paper draws the following three conclusions:First,using evolutionary game analysis,the long-term equilibrium between the government and consumers is that the government withdraws subsidies for new energy vehicles and consumers will consciously choose new energy vehicles.To achieve this long-term stability,the government needs to participate and give certain subsidies to the new energy auto industry.Second,the increase in sales of new energy vehicles brought about by the purchase subsidies of new energy vehicles is a short-term effect,and will not affect the development of new energy vehicles in the long run.If the purchase subsidy for consumers disappears completely,the effect of the subsidy policy will disappear,and the desire for new energy vehicles will not be increased for a long time.Third,subsidies for related facilities of new energy vehicles can change the optimal path of new energy vehicles.The impact on new energy vehicles is a long-term effect.The improvement effect of subsidies will continue to be better and better.Promote the long-term development of the new energy automotive industry.It can be seen from the research on China's new energy vehicle subsidy policy that China's subsidy policy is insufficient and there are still areas for further improvement.Therefore,this paper puts forward the following suggestions for China's new energy vehicle subsidy policy:First,when the price of new energy vehicles is high,the purchase subsidy for new energy vehicles can promote consumers' consumption of new energy vehicles,but when the price drops to a certain extent After that,the subsidy for the purchase of new energy vehicles will not promote the increase in sales of new energy vehicles.In light of the current situation in China,large-scale purchase subsidies for new energy vehicles are still being given,and the best policy objectives cannot be achieved.On the contrary,increasing subsidies for new energy vehicle supporting facilities can change the optimal path for new energy vehicle sales,so more attention should be paid to subsidies for new energy vehicle-related facilities to promote the long-term progress of new energy vehicles.Second,the research and development subsidies for the core technologies of new energy vehicles are the intrinsic factors affecting the price and convenience of new energy vehicles.The government should increase investment in research and development subsidies,improve the core technologies of new energy vehicles,and reduce the purchase of new energy vehicles.And the cost of use,ultimately relying on market mechanisms to promote the progress of the new energy automotive industry.Third,we must pay attention to the promotion and guidance of consumers,increase consumers' awareness of new energy vehicles,thereby enhancing consumers' preference for new energy vehicles,and making new energy vehicles more popular.
Keywords/Search Tags:New energy vehicles, Evolutionary game, Subsidy policy, Purchase subsidies, Supporting facilities subsidies
PDF Full Text Request
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