Horizontal Competition Of Majority Shareholders,strategy Position And Enterprise Value

Horizontal Competition is likely to trigger conflicts of interest between major shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders.The CSRC has repeatedly made every effort to avoid it.However,due to the restructuring and strategic restructuring of state-owned enterprises in China,there is still a certain percentage of listed companies that have competition in the same industry,and this problem has not yet been effectively and thoroughly resolved.In 2011,FAW Xiali had a horizontal competition with another group company,FAW Car,in the restructuring of state-owned enterprises.In order to distinguish the business operations of the two parties,the major shareholder has always restricted FAW Xiali to the development of the economical car market,where market demand is shrinking,and has restricted the technological research and development of enterprises.While China's auto industry pays attention to independent R&D,transformation and upgrading,FAW Xiali's strategic positioning under the arrangement of major shareholders is contrary to the industry development trend,which is a kind of abnormal strategic positioning with high degree of difference.FAW Xiali has suffered losses for six consecutive years since 2012(excluding non-recurring income),and the loss amount is up to 1.7 billion yuan.The value of the company has been seriously damaged.Therefore,this paper takes FAW Xiali as the research object,and whether the competition of major shareholders will affect the strategic positioning of the enterprise and the mechanism of the influence of abnormal high-discrimination strategic positioning on the value of the enterprise.Based on the logical chain of “environmental factors – strategic positioning – financial behavior – corporate value”,this paper finds that the problem of horizontal competition is an important reason for FAW Xiali to go down from “national car”.In the context of peer competition,on the one hand,major shareholders need to reduce the overlap of the business scope of the two subsidiaries based on policy requirements;on the other hand,in order to capture private gains from control,they have incentives to allocate higher-quality development resources to higher stakes Another subsidiary.Therefore,major shareholders,through highly concentrated equity control and personnel control,arrange for listed companies to adopt abnormal strategic positioning with a high degree of difference from the industry's conventional strategies in order to encroach on corporate development opportunities.This makes the company's product profitability worse,agency costs are higher,research and development efficiency is lower,financing constraints are higher,and ultimately destroy corporate value.The research significance of this paper is to reveal the influence mechanism of the horizontal competition on the value of the enterprise from the perspective of strategic positioning,and deeply analyze the hidden short-selling behavior of the major shareholder through the intervention of the strategic positioning of the listed company.In addition,this paper has certain warning significance for listed companies with horizontal competition,and proposes to solve this problem by effectively solving the problem of horizontal competition,strengthening the supervision of competition in the industry,timely adjusting the strategic positioning of the company,and improving the internal governance structure of the company.