Can Husserl's Phenomenological Epistemology Save The Foundationalism?

The theory of justification has been the main topic in contemporary epistemology.Foundationalism is one of the most important theory among the several versions of justification.According to it,we can discriminate two kinds of belief:basic belief and non-basic belief.The former's epistemic status(that is,its being justified)does not depend on any other belief,but the latter derives it's justification from the former.For foundationalism,the central problem is:how basic belief itself is justified if its being justified does not rely on any other belief?According to the traditional 'Givenness theory',the content of basic belief is directly given to the mind,so the subject can directly grasp its content by some mental acts.In this sense,the justification of the basic belief does not indeed rely on any other beliefs.Unfortunately,the 'Givenness theory' has been criticized by many philosophers.Sellars and BonJour are the two leading frontiers who try to argue that foundationalism could not find a way-out from its dilemma,even if appealing to the 'Givenness theory'.In this essay,I shall argue that we can solve the dilemma by taking advantage of the theoretical resources from Husserlian phenomenology.