Regulatory Strategies For Tax Evasion In Film And Television Industry

In June 2018,Fan Bingbing's yin and yang contract tax evasion case opened the tip of the iceberg for film and television stars to evade taxes.In fact,the high-income groups represented by film and television stars in China have the characteristics of diversified income sources,instability,and complexity of forms.The use of yin and yang contracts for tax evasion has emerged endlessly.In order to ensure the integrity of tax sources and maintain social fairness and justice This issue needs urgent solution.In order to curb the tax evasion of yin and yang contracts in the film and television industry from the root cause,this paper combines the A-S tax evasion model and game theory model to construct a tax and withholding game model for the film and television industry.The model derivation results show that when the tax evasion costs of withholding agents have increased significantly,the higher audit rate and the multiples of the withholding agent's fines can inhibit the tax evasion decisions of withholding agents,and there is no longer a choice for high tax evasion behaviors.Benefit Basis for Tax Evasion.Due to the difficulty of auditing the tax evasion behavior of the yin and yang contract,the author believes that indirect economic factors such as industry norms and social supervision should be used to promote film and television practitioners to improve tax compliance.Therefore,the taxpayers and withholding agents before and after the introduction of the prior tax evasion reporting mechanism are analyzed.The game outcome of tax evasion decisions changes.This paper also analyzes the classic case of Fan Bingbing's "yin and yang contract" tax evasion into the game model and finds that if the inspection efforts and fines of both parties are increased to a higher level set by the model,the selection strategy of withholding agents and taxpayers exists in Nash Equilibrium solution: do not evade taxes.If the level of tax evasion in this case is reduced,the thresholds for tax evasion on the taxpayer side and the withholding agent side will be raised after the introduction of the prior tax evasion willingness reporting mechanism.Among them,the threshold for tax evasion claims by star taxpayers is increased by 8.60%,and the film crew's withholding obligation The threshold for people's willingness to cooperate with tax escalation is 4.45%,which proves that such ex-ante supervision measures have a positive effect on curbing "yin and yang contracts" with low tax evasion.Finally,this article puts forward the corresponding improvement suggestions for the regulatory strategy of "yin-yang contract" tax evasion behavior.