Game Research On Key Stakeholders In The Process Of Land Expropriation

With the development of economic and urbanization,land expropriation is becoming more and more common.In particular,if the local government fail to act,they will be in violation of the law.Sometimes,it will lead to lose life in the process of land expropriation.Although this is an extreme phenomenon,but enough to show the great harm caused by illegal land expropriation and that we must settle the contradictions between stakeholders.The contradiction between the stakeholders is determined by their game relationship.Therefore,this paper constructs and analyzes the game model to solve the contradiction and promote the smooth progress of the expropriation.At first,this paper gives the definition of land expropriation stakeholders.After identifying the stakeholders in the expropriation,we applies Freeman's power and interest matrix to the key stakeholder identification in the process of land acquisition,identifying three key Stakeholders finally:local governments,farmers and the central government.Then we analyze the power and interest of the three key stakeholders and the interest relationship between them.Based on the analysis result and the game process of the key stakeholders in reality,a three-party incomplete information dynamic game model is established.According to the model equilibrium result,the optimal equilibrium is selected by using the principle of total payment maximization.Finally,according to the optimal equilibrium results,we put forward the proposal to reduce the illegal forced eviction in the process of expropriation.According to optimal equilibrium,the countermeasures of the strong local government in the land expropriation game are put forward:(1)Increase the punishment of local government illegal acts.Based on the same income,increasing penalties will reduce illegal land expropriation profits,it can reduce the local government illegal acts;(2)Reduce the cost of appeals of farmers and reduce the cost of supervision of the central government.By the former,the farmers need to take less time to consider the cost of appeals and will better protect their own interests.The latter makes the central government more likely take supervision.The combination of the two,farmers' rights can be better protected;(3)Perfect the corresponding information disclosure system of the central government.Under the premise of"economic man",the central government will better fulfill its supervisory duties;(4)Establish the corresponding rights protection mechanism by the introduction of project social evaluation system.With the establishment of the project social evaluation system,you can look it as a project.The evaluation of the work of the local government will reduce illegal acts;(5)Innovate resettlement.The local government can provide farmers with long-term resettlement measures,making farmers more receptive to the expropriation.These conclusions can promote smooth expropriation and help relevant state departments make decision;(6)Change China's Land Two-track System.