Game Analysis During The Process Of Rural Land Expropriation

With the developing of China’s urbanization and industrialization of the city, the scale of land requisition is increasing, but also increased the disputes caused by land expropriation compensation and resettlement. Many scholars construct the game model, analyze the game process between local government and farmers, and analyze the parties taking different strategies that lead to different game result. Seek the game results in a balanced that the government and the farmers whose land was expropriated meet the interest allocation way.Many scholars have adopted the method of static game analysis, but this game could not simulate well the reality. In reality, the local government and lost land farmers will conduct several dynamic games. Before the local government in land acquisition, they will enter into the village and have an investigation. Government promises to farmers as early as they pay the land,, they will be rewarded by some compensation. If farmers do not agree, the government will give farmers pressure, and finally, the government will be forced relocation. The land expropriated farmers will adopt different approaches to the game. The first method is refusal to sign, asking the government to increase the amount of compensation. And then is the petition. And also set up tents on the day and night, guarding homeland. Finally, farmers may lead to violent resistance. It is due to the dynamic nature of reality in the game, so we need to establish a dynamic game model. But information asymmetry is a common existing between the government and farmers in the process of land expropriation condition, so the establishment of game model of complete information under the conditions of the two sides can not well reflect the reality of the situation.To overcome the existing research, this paper established the incomplete information dynamic game model under the condition of both sides to bargain. Through establishing the model, simulated reality and draw more realistic conclusions. The research proved that: Both local governments and farmers, as long as the party master bargaining power information of the other party, the two sides will avoid conflict with each other in the course of the game, and avoid mutual pressure conditions. On the contrary, if the two sides do not know bargaining power information of the other party, the two sides in the course of the game will put pressure on each other and have mutual concessions.According to the conclusions, policy recommendations are as follows:(1)To improve the legal awareness of farmers and enhance the ability of farmers to the game.(2)To adhere the negotiation and limit the compulsory acquisition of land.(3)To limit the role of government in land expropriation and reform the one-sided view of achievements.(4) To improve the security system of landless peasants and establish the employment security mechanism.(5) To formulate reasonable land compensation scheme and guarantee the legitimate interests of the owner.