Research On Supportting Mechanism Of Right To Know And Power Of Decision-Making Of Shareholders' Of Listed Companies

Although the framework of the current law in China refers to the company's shareholders have the right to participate in the company's major decisions and the rights to certain companies,and to stipulate the general meeting system and the information disclosure system of listed companies.However,the legal concept that has no clear definition of the shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making has not been clearly revealed.Therefore,the guiding role for practice is very limited.The supporting facilities are imperfect and the operability is poor.In fact,not only in practice,but also in theoretical research,the connotation of shareholders' right to know and decision-making participation in listed companies is not uniform and clear in the domestic legal and judicial practice circles,which is extremely unfavorable for its application in practice..In addition,the immature regulatory aspects and the weak awareness of the rights and interests of investors and listed companies in terms of shareholders' right to know and decision-making participation have led to the failure of well-executed shareholders' communication and shareholder participation in practice.In turn,it has led to the indifference and supervision of the overall interests of listed shareholders in the entire capital market system.Article 4 of the "Company Law" of China in 1993 established the company's shareholder rights,which can be said to be the root cause of China's "equity thinking".This paper believes that in the connotation of the concept of shareholders' equity,the decision-making participation rights of shareholders on major issues are especially core.Shareholders directly or indirectly participate in corporate governance through statutory channels,which is the premise that other shareholders' rights can be achieved well and effectively.The right to know is the basis of decision-making participation rights.Only under the premise of fully understanding the company's business operations,the decision-making participation of shareholders seems to be meaningful.The study of the shareholder's decision-making participation rights of listed companies cannot be separated from the discussion of shareholders' right to know.Therefore,this paper locates the research scope as the shareholder's right to know and the decision-making participation guarantee system.Obviously,in the current Chinese capital market,the shareholders' right to know and decision-making participation rights of listed companies have not achieved good exercise of utility.Therefore,this paper attempts to clarify the connotation and extension of the concept of shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making,and establish a comprehensive and comprehensive listed company shareholder who can adapt to China's current national conditions from the perspective of multi-party capital market participants.The right to know and the security system for decision-making participation rights enhance the exercise of the shareholder's right to know and the right to participate in decision-making.This article will be divided into four chapters to discuss:The first chapter first discusses the related concepts of the shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making,including its connotation and extension.Secondly,its institutional composition,including investor relations management system,shareholder inquiry system and shareholder meeting system;The value orientation of the company's shareholder's right to know and the decision-making participation system mainly includes the theory of shareholder rights,the theory of information asymmetry,the letter of credit of directors,and the discussion on "board centralism" and "shareholder centralism".Shareholders' right to know and decision-making participation rights are theoretically prepared.The second chapter discusses the necessity of improving the legal rights of shareholders of China's listed companies and the security system of decision-making participation by discussing the right to know and the right to participate in decision-making and the common interests and the natural weakness of the legal status of small and medium-sized shareholders.By analyzing the status quo of the rights protection system,this paper explores the historical roots and institutional defects of the current situation of the shareholders' right to know and the participation of decision-making participation rights in listed companies,and makes legislative choices for improving the shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making.It is clear that the full realization of the shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making of listed companies depends not only on the confirmation of this right by the law,but also on the support of other systems.The realization of the system in line with international norms and practices is its future development direction.The third chapter undertakes the above,the legal system of the mainland capital market and the developed capital markets of the United States,the United Kingdom,Hong Kong and other countries in the listed company's shareholders' right to know and the right to participate in decision-making,as well as the practice of shareholder participation and shareholder communication.Comparison.Focus on summarizing and analyzing the relevant legislative models and regulatory concepts outside the domain,and introducing the “comply or explain” corporate governance principles as a supplement and assistance to modern laws.On the basis of the previous arguments,the fourth chapter is based on the current development stage of China's capital market in the “emerging + transition”,combined with domestic and foreign beneficial practices,respectively,from the perspective of the participants in the capital market,the legislative rights are clearly defined,and the legislative system is sorted out.The corporate governance norms arrangement advocates voluntary norms,mandatory norms and advocacy norms in parallel;the implementation proposes a multi-channel system of practical proposals for the rationalization of shareholders' communication and shareholder participation in listed companies;thus exploring the suitability of China's national conditions.The listed company's shareholder's right to know and the decision-making participation rights guarantee path.