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CSRC Administrative Penalty,Competitive Pressure In Aduit Market And Audit Quality

Posted on:2020-04-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y H ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2416330575479161Subject:Accounting
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In recent years,with the frequent occurrence of audit failure cases,the role of CSRC administrative punishment has been paid more and more attention.Audited accounting information is one of the core ways to alleviate the asymmetry of capital market information,and the quality of accounting information depends on audit quality.Generally speaking,audit quality depends on audit demand,audit supply and audit supervision.However,in the emerging transition market such as China,the listed companies have strong motivation for earnings management,insufficient demand for high-quality audit,and low audit pricing strategies adopted by accounting firms in the face of competitive pressure.The allocation of audit resources required for normal audit procedures is seriously affected,resulting in The supply of high-quality audit is difficult,and the legal litigation mechanism has little effect on audit quality.In this case,the government regulation implemented by the CSRC is indispensable to the audit quality.Since 1998,CSRC has gradually strengthened the investigation and punishment of audit failure cases,and has issued administrative "penalty" to accounting firms that have failed audit.According to statistics,from 2001 to 2017,an average of 4 accounting firms were penalized each year,and the number of penalties,the level of punishment and the amount of punishment increased significantly.Since the CSRC attaches so much importance to administrative punishment,a natural question is whether the CSRC administrative penalty can effectively curb the opportunistic behavior of accounting firms and auditors.Furthermore,can the CSRC's administrative penalty have an error correction effect on the relationship between the competitive pressure in the audit market and the audit quality? Based on this,this paper takes the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2013-2017 as the sample,and takes the absolute value of control accrual as the substitute variable of audit quality.This paper empirically analyzes the transmission mechanism and transmission effect of CSRC's administrative penalty and audit market competition pressure on audit quality and their intersections in the process.Mutual relations.The results show that the market competition pressure faced by accounting firms is negatively related to audit quality,and the administrative penalty of CSRC is significantly positively correlated with audit quality.Moreover,the CSRC's administrative punishment can restrain the negative influence of competition pressure on audit quality to some extent.Further research shows that the error-correcting effect of CSRC administrative punishment will increase with the increase of the number of penalties,the level of punishment and the amount of punishment.Compared with the past,the contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following three aspects:(1)the relationship between the competitive pressure of the audit market and the audit quality is still controversial.On the basis of previous studies,this paper further discusses the mechanism and effect of competitive pressure on audit quality,which is helpful to realize the unification of conclusions in this field as soon as possible.(2)different from most previous literature,we only use whether or not to be punished by the CSRC to set up virtual variables to investigate the transmission mechanism of CSRC's administrative penalty,we from whether or not to be punished,administrative punishment times,Four Dimensions of Administrative penalty level and Administrative penalty amount to depict Accounting firms being certified The situation of administrative punishment of the CSRC not only helps to improve the depth and objectivity of the argument,but also provides a useful perspective for the research of CSRC in the field of administrative punishment;(3)this paper embeds the strategy choice in the market competition of accounting firm into the transmission mechanism of CSRC's administrative penalty,and reveals the subjective dynamic reaction of accounting firm in the face of administrative penalty.It not only helps us to fully clarify the audit behavior choice of accounting firms,but also constructs a meso-interactive bridge between macro-supervision system and micro-firm behavior.There is also the reform of government supervision system and the choice of competition strategy of accounting firms.Certain theoretical significance and practical value.
Keywords/Search Tags:CSRC Administrative penalty, Competitive pressure, Discretionary Accruals, Audit quality
PDF Full Text Request
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