Research On Individual Behavior Decision-making In Dispute Settlement Mechanism Of Collective Forest Land Contract

In recent years,due to the increasingly frequent transfer of collective forest lands,collective forest land contract disputes have also appeared frequently and frequently.When disputes and conflicts occur in general,disputes can be settled through reconciliation,mediation,arbitration and litigation.The study found that in the process of dispute resolution,dispute subjects have irrational behavior that cannot be explained by general economic theory.This paper focuses on individual behavioral decision-making in dispute resolutio n mechanisms for collective forestland contracted management.Combining the literature with the study paradigm of behavioral economics psychological account theory and law and economics,construct a theoretical analysis framework for individual behavior decision-making in collective forestland contractual dispute resolution mechanisms.First of al,it puts forward the research hypothesis: the irrational behavior in the decision-making of dispute conflict and resolution can be explained by the psychological account theory in behavioral economics.Secondly,game theory is used to describe the behavioral decisions of both sides of disputes in the collective forestland contractual dispute resolution mechanism,and the hypothesis is used to construct the game model under the economic account and the psychological account respectively.Finally,the hypothesis is tested by taking the litigation stage of dispute settlement mechanism for collective forest land contractual management as an example.Research indicates:(1)From the perspective of different accounts,there are differences in the cost terms of the collective forestland dispute settlement mechanism.From the economic account perspective,dispute individuals consider direct costs and time costs,spiritual costs,and social costs at various stages of dispute resolution.In the perspective of mental accounts,individuals in disputes only consider direct costs.The dispute resolution mechanism has the same revenue from different account perspectives.(2)The research hypothesis is verified in the empirical stage,that is,the majority of litigious individual actions in the litigation process of collective forestland contracted management disputes conforms to the rational economy hypothesis,but there are also some irrational behaviors that can be explained by the psychologica l account theory.The specific content is: First,the vast majority of individual litigation activit ies meet the cost-benefit principle under the economics account.That is to say,when individ ua l litigation proceeds are higher than the sum of direct costs and indirect costs,their litiga t io n behavior is rational,which is consistent with the rational economy hypothesis;Second,a small number of individual litigation activities do not satisfy the cost-benefit principle under the economics account,but satisfy the principle of cost-benefit under psychological accounts.That is to say,in the perspective of mental accounts,when the income is higher than the direct cost,its litigation behavior is also rational;Third,a very small number of individuals continue to sue when the litigation proceeds are lower than the litigation costs from the perspective of the psychological account,which is due to the measurement error of the baseline.This paper provides a theoretical basis for explaining the irrational behavior in collective forest rights disputes.