The Study On Abusing The Dominant Market Position Relating To Cybereconomy

As the technology advances,the Internet's use is growing wider,and Chinese netizens have exceeded 700 million.The proportion of the cybereconomy in the economic aggregate is gradually increasing,and the growth rate is accelerating.After the application of the concept of "Internet plus",the traditional industries have improved in the past with poor communication and information asymmetry.However,there is competition in the market and there is a monopoly in competition.Competition and monopoly are two sides in one coin.Cybereconomy is a sunrise industry and a battlefield of business competition.In order to maintain market order and standardize market behavior,it is necessary to carry out its legal regulation.However,since China's anti-monopoly law was promulgated in 2008,its relevant supporting laws and regulations are not yet completed,and regulations of the anti-monopoly law are in the abstract,and it is difficult to execute.It is found that defining the abuse of a dominating market position faces difficulties in the network economy,and the traditional method appears to be weak and unsatisfactory.This article analyzes the influence of the cybereconomy on the existing methods,by identifying the relevant market,identifying the dominating market position,the abuse of the market dominating position,and will come up the idea to improve.The first chapter is mainly about the overview of cybereconomy,including the definition and characteristics of cybereconomy,in order to clear the differences between cybereconomy and traditional economy.And there are three characters which impact the traditional method,including two-sided market,network externality and positive feedback effect.The second chapter analyzes the influence of cybereconomy on the traditional identifying methods in the relevant market,the market share and trade barriers.In terms of the relevant market,two-sided market,network eternality and “lock-in effect”lead the traditional alternative analysis method and hypothetical monopolization testing method to be a difficulty to apply.In terms of the market share,the existence of "critical capacity" in the cybereconomy and the transitivity of both sides of the network market,the interference factors of judgment are increased.What's more,there are other impotent statistics in network market,such as operational use time and number of independent users,which will mislead the market share to a fault result,if the traditional methods are applied as before.When it comes to the market barriers,the positive feedback effect often leads an enterprise to monopoly or oligopoly in its industry,and the enterprise's IP and conduction patterns will develop into industry standards and market barriers.Moreover,“lock-in effect” is also a market barrier,which makes it costly for users to move away,and new competitors are struggling to grab the attention of incumbents,especially in areas such as instant messaging.The third chapter analyzes the influence of cybereconomy on the traditional identifying methods in the abuse of the market dominating position,by listing three abusing behavior,namely tie-in,rejection of compatibility and rejection access to necessary facilities.In the case of tie-ins,the traditional tie-in is usually associated with the "buy",while the majority of Internet companies are free,which is more like a gift in form,although the gift often goes against the buyer's wishes.It is doubtful whether this form of free can be a place of exemption.The rejection of compatibility is similar to the "restrain transaction" in the anti-monopoly law.However,the main situation of the restrain transaction concerned by the anti-monopoly law is usually aupstream enterprise control the downstream enterprises,and its purpose is to consolidate its monopoly position by refusing to trade.In the case of "Tencent case",Tencent QQ which is in the field of instant messaging refuses to be compatible with Qihoo 360 which is in the field of network security,and this rejection is difficult to meet all the elements of "no transaction".Besides,the principle of necessary facilities and the protection of intellectual property,which is very controversial in the traditional industry,and in the cybereconomy,the idea of the concept of "necessary" and "controlling" should be much more prudent.The forth chapter makes perfect Suggestions for the second and the third chapters.In respect to the relevant market,this chapter improves the existing hypothesis monopolization testing method,and proposes two methods,namely profit model testing method and discriminating treatment method according to the transaction type.In the case that the definition does have difficulty or the result is biased,it can even weaken the function of defining the relevant market and directly "speak with facts".To determine the market share,this chapter introduces the concept of "comparative advantage" to make up for the defect of the traditional method with the share as the main or even the only standard.In regard to the identification of abuse,this chapter focuses on the more controversial "rejection access to necessary facilities" behavior and discusses what scope can be applied to the "necessary facilities principle".