Anti-corruption,political Correlation And Enterprise Innovation

At present,China is in an important period of slowing economic growth and timely adjustment of industrial structure.In the past,the mode of relying on high investment and high savings to stimulate economic growth has gradually declined.At this time,new dynamic factors are urgently needed,and independent innovation is not only stimulating the vitality of innovation in the whole society and also enhancing national competitiveness.However,China's independent innovation capability is not high enough,and the characteristics of China's "political centralization and economic decentralization" make government officials have a lot of power over economic resources.Enterprises will establish political connection with the government to get privilege and preferential treatment with the government.And enterprises need to occupy certain funds of the enterprise in order to seek such political connection.Under the condition that the capital resources of the enterprise are limited,the funds that enterprises can use for enterprise innovation are bound to decrease a lot.In the short run,the benefits that the political connection brings to the enterprises are much higher than the benefits of independent innovation.Therefore,companies may be more inclined to seek political connections and less independent innovation.After the 18 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,China carried out a policy of high-pressure anti-corruption.The central government adhered to the attitude of “flies and tigers playing together” and resolutely cracked down on officials who violated the law.The close relationship between enterprises and government-related personnel are broken and the policy has increased the risk that enterprises will continue to seek political connections.In this situation,enterprises want to gain development and choose to take the road of enterprise innovation and improve their competitiveness.This paper selects the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2010 to 2016.Firstly,it combines China's institutional background including anti-corruption policy and China's fiscal and taxation policies that encourage enterprises to innovate.At the same time,it is based on rent-seeking theory,entrusted generation theory and political cost theory.In this paper,the panel data model is used to study the relationship between political association and enterprise innovation,and the dual difference propensity score matching model(DID-PSM)is used to study the relationship between anti-corruption and enterprise innovation.The study found that:(1)Political connection has a negative relationship with enterprise innovation,and political connection has a substitute effect on enterprise innovation;the negative relationship between non-state-owned enterprise political connection and enterprise innovation is more significant,while state-owned enterprise political connection and enterprise innovation is negative The relationship is not significant enough and the effect is not stable.(2)Anti-corruption is more significant in promoting the innovation of enterprises based on political connections.It can be further found that the more grassroots officials in anti-corruption investigations,the greater the promotion of corporate innovation.(3)Anti-corruption in state-owned enterprises has a significant role in promoting corporate innovation.According to the conclusions drawn from the research in this paper,several suggestions are put forward:(1)improving the anti-corruption system and weakening the political connection incentives;(2)actively promoting the transformation of the government's functions and standardizing the relationship between the government and the market;(3)guiding the enterprise innovation developing and strengthening the reform of state-owned enterprises.