The Impact Of Officials' Turnover,Tenure And Achievement Pressure On Public Goods Supply Preferences

In the past 40 years of reform and opening up,the rapid development of China's economy is not only due to the tremendous achievements of economic restructuring,but also from the transformation of social and political systems.Although China has created a "miracle" of rapid economic growth,the welfare situation of the broad masses of people still needs to be further improved.One of the most direct manifestations is that the supply of social public goods closely related to people's lives is insufficient to a certain extent,and even there are some phenomena such as "difficult to go to school,difficult to see a doctor,difficult to buy a house".Therefore,the supply preference of local public goods has attracted great attention from the government and academia,but the traditional fiscal decentralization theory has some difficulties in explaining the supply preference of local public goods.Existing relevant studies incorporate fiscal incentives and political incentives into the interpretation framework.They believe that under the "Chinese-style" decentralization system,local governments pay more attention to the field of economic public goods supply,while neglecting the development of social public goods supply.However,most studies regard government and officials as a whole,thus neglecting the role of officials in the process of economic and social development,and failed to explain the incentives and preferences of local governments.This paper studies the supply preference of local public goods from the perspective of local officials,aiming to provide evidence for the influence of officials on the supply preference of local public goods.The first chapter mainly introduces the research background and significance.The second chapter reviews the existing literature on official turnover,achievement pressure,official tenure and preference for public goods supply.The third chapter defines the core concepts,combs the relevant theories,and puts forward three levels of research hypothesis.The fourth chapter includes data sources,model settings and variable descriptions.In the fifth chapter,the urban panel data from 2003 to 2013 are used to examine the effects of official turnover,achievement pressure and official tenure on local public goods supply preference.The results of benchmark regression are tested by regionalization and robustness,and the temporal effects of official turnover on public goods supply preference are explored in depth.Research shows that:(1)Official turnover has a positive impact on the supply of economic public goods and a negative impact on the supply of social public goods,which confirms the preference problems of official turnover in the supply of public goods;(2)Achievement pressure significantly promotes the supply of economic public goods,but significantly inhibits the supply of social public goods,which also shows that achievement pressure can lead to local officials have preferences for public goods supply;(3)There is a U-shaped curve relationship between the term of office of officials and economic public goods supply,and an inverted Ushaped curve relationship with social public goods supply,indicating that officials will adopt biased public goods supply strategy during their term of office;(4)The effect of the above conclusions is also affected by regional differences;(5)The influence of official turnover on local public goods supply preference has a period effect.According to the above conclusions,the last chapter of this paper proposes that the central and provincial governments should maintain the stability of local officials and extend their tenure of office appropriately,reduce the preference of public goods supply caused by the replacement of officials,continue to increase the weight of people's livelihood assessment indicators,prevent the distortion of local public goods supply caused by economic performance assessment,and increase the transformation of social public goods.Transfer expenditure to promote the transformation of local government public finance.