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Research On The Mechanism Of Improving The Performance Of Anti-money Laundering Regulation

Posted on:2021-02-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X X ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2416330623981091Subject:Economic Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Money laundering is the "cancer" of human society.Nowadays,the economy is increasingly diversified and globalized.Money laundering seriously threatens the international financial order and security.It is extremely urgent to prevent and combat money laundering.Since the implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering Law in 2006,the anti-money laundering crackdown and control work has experienced the scenes of "blowout of anti-money laundering law enforcement cases" and "increasing anti-money laundering penalties".The explosive number of law enforcement and the severe punishment accompanying it not only reflect that it is difficult to contain China's money laundering problem by fighting alone,but also increase the business pressure of anti-money laundering obligation agencies.This dilemma of anti-money laundering reflects that China's current anti-money laundering operation mechanism is not yet mature,and the improvement of anti-money laundering performance is insufficient.In order to explore the causes of the dilemma of anti-money laundering,we can start from the economic attribute of money laundering and use externality analysis tools to compare the cost-benefit problem between money laundering and anti-money laundering,thus obtaining that in the practice of "money laundering-anti-money laundering",there is an "anti-money laundering incentive paradox" : money laundering is an economic behavior in which money launderers push risks and benefits to the extreme,in which there is an imbalance between positive externality and negative externality.Money launderers benefit from money laundering but do not bear enough cost,resulting in negative externality oversupply;Financial institutions' fight against money laundering benefits the society but has not received sufficient compensation,making positive externalities unable to guarantee supply.However,in order to solve the anti-money laundering incentive paradox and get out of the predicament of insufficient anti-money laundering performance,we must internalize the externality of money laundering and anti-money laundering.On the one hand,we must overcome the negative externality of money laundering,increase the cost of money laundering,intensify the investigation and punishment of money laundering,and improve the detection rate of money laundering,so as to achieve the purpose that the cost of money laundering is greater than the proceeds of money laundering,eliminate the problem of excessive money laundering,and fundamentally curb money laundering.On the other hand,we must eliminate the positive externality of anti-money laundering,increase the supply of anti-money laundering,increase the investment in anti-money laundering,stimulate the enthusiasm of the voluntary agencies in anti-money laundering,unblock the channels of interest compensation,give appropriate subsidies,and balance the costs and benefits so as to achieve Pareto optimality of anti-money laundering.In order to use the above theories to solve the practical problems of anti-money laundering,we must focus on the system level,build a set of system mechanism to eliminate money laundering and the externality of money laundering based on the experience of other advanced regions and countries and the national conditions.Compared with the U.S.model of "complete system and severe punishment," the British model of "flexible supervision and combination of rewards and punishments" and the Hong Kong model of "risk-based,emphasis on evaluation",China still has the problems of weak restriction and lack of incentives in the anti-money laundering system,which are manifested in two aspects:small punishment,insufficient investment and lack of incentive mechanism combining internal and external factors.Based on the principle of problem-oriented and focusing on improving implementation performance,this paper proposes to construct an anti-money laundering restraint and incentive mechanism: on the one hand,establish an anti-money laundering restraint mechanism to overcome the negative externalities of money laundering by establishing credible anti-money laundering punishment mechanism,effectiveness evaluation system,implementing risk-based concept,implementing differential supervision,paying attention to modern information technology,and strengthening anti-money laundering personnel training.On the other hand,an anti-money laundering incentive mechanism should be established to overcome the positive externalities of anti-money laundering by implementing a system of dividing the recovered money laundering crime income,establishing an investigation subsidy system for anti-money laundering staff of grassroots people's banks,and establishing an anti-money laundering reputation incentive system.
Keywords/Search Tags:Anti-money laundering, Externalities, Performance improvement, Incentive mechanism, Constraint mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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