Research On The Supervision System Of Security Analysts' Conflicts Of Interest

As the information bridge between companies and investors,security analysts collect and process both public and private company information.They use their expertise to analyze and interpret the information,thus giving investors advice on security trading and rating.As one of the “reputation agencies” in the security market,it plays the role of “gatekeeper” in the market.However,under the joint effect of economic roots and laws roots,the independence of security analysts is difficult to maintain in practice.The emergence of analysts' conflicts of interest may lead to market manipulation,insider trading or misrepresentation.At the same time,analysts have obvious optimistic incentives.Thus,security analysts' conflicts of interest need to be solved.Based on the theory of reputation mechanism and the theory of balance of interest,this paper explores the regulation of analysts' conflicts of interest,focuses on the fiduciary relationship between analysts and investors,and the fiduciary duties that analysts taken on.The solution of securities analysts' conflicts of interest lies in the joint force of market regulation,legal regulation and self-discipline rules.Faced with the status quo of China's supervision and existing problems,this paper tries to learn from US regulation experience on the isolation of analysts' conflicts of interest,information disclosure and analysts' civil liability.This paper reaches the conclusion that,in the pre-regulation stage,the existing rules of interest conflicts isolation should be supplemented,and the occasions and contents of disclosure should be redefined.In the post-event supervision stage,the gap in the civil liability of the analysts' conflicts of interest should be filled,and the commitment of analysts' administrative responsibility should be improved.