Research On Antitrust Regulations Of Predatory Pricing On Multilateral Platforms

Predatory pricing has long been considered the most difficult issue in antitrust law.Because predatory pricing is required to bear losses that may lead to bankruptcy,and compensation for losses after excluding competitors is uncertain.Therefore,the traditional antitrust theories generally consider that predatory pricing is not rational and need not to be regulated.Antitrust Enforcement Agency insists that allowing companies to compete at low prices will not hinder competition,but benefit consumers in the short term.This traditional perception has been challenged with the rise of new operation mode of multilateral platforms.The characteristics of multilateral platforms operating simultaneously in multiple markets make their pricing strategies more complex and more subtle in the way they are compensated.Based on this,economists began to use new economic theories such as bilateral markets to make a reasonable explanation of whether low-price competition on multilateral platforms hinders market competition.According to this theory,the free strategy of multilateral platforms may be the survival strategy under the network effect,and the antitrust law should handle it with caution.However,the subsidy may make prices below cost and should be brought to the attention of Antitrust Enforcement Agency.Because multilateral platforms may use this strategy to create barriers to market access.Whether this kind of competitive behavior should be punished by antitrust law will be different in different countries' legislative purposes and national conditions.A comprehensive examination of the value orientation of predatory pricing by the United States and the European Union shows that different antitrust law value orientations affect the legal standards adopted in judicial practice,which in turn makes the degree of leniency in antitrust enforcement different.From paying attention to the interests of vulnerable groups to focusing on consumer welfare and efficiency,the United States has gone through the process of antitrust law enforcement from strict to broad.In order to ensure free competition in the market and enable consumers to enjoy lower market prices,the current attitude of the United States to predatory pricing regulation is that,in view of its rare occurrence,we should set a higher recognition standard for it to avoid false positive errors.The difference is that in the EU,Antitrust Enforcement Agency are more concerned about the competition process and market structure.Although an enterprise can defend efficiently,the premise is that its behavior should not be harmful to the operation of the market competition mechanism.The different value orientations of the United States and the European Union explain why predatory pricing cases rarely win in the United States in recent years,but can get relief in the European Union.In view of the diversified legislative purposes embodied in China's current Antitrust Law,it is necessary to comprehensively consider the analysis elements of the competition process in the antitrust cases with reference to the price tools of the United States and Europe.Due to the complexity of the pricing structure and market behavior of the multilateral platform and the realistic dilemma that the relevant data is difficult to measure accurately,this paper believes that when determining the predatory pricing of the multilateral platform,if the price instrument is difficult to use,it is advisable to pay more attention to how the multilateral platform compete in the market and the impact of the market behavior on the order of competition.Combined with this new idea,this paper specifically analyzes the subsidy behavior of the online car-hailing platform,and holds that the low price strategy of online car-hailing platform has not formed a barrier sufficient to hinder the market entry,so it should not be regarded as predatory pricing.Combined with the antitrust experience of the United States and the European Union,and the specific analysis of the online car-hailing platform,this paper believes that in response to the challenges brought by multilateral platforms,Antitrust Enforcement Agency should pay attention to both the economic efficiency and the market structure.This means that the analysis of antitrust law should not only consider the price change,but should specifically analyze the impact of market competition and market structure according to the differences of individual cases,so as to make a more accurate judgment.