Research On Compensation Mechanism Of Patent Infringement Based On The Perspective Of Endogenous Quality Of Patent

In the era of knowledge economy,patent system as an economic system,is the most effective innovation mechanism to promote social technological innovation and accelerate the process of economic development.However,due to the uncertainty of patent value and the misuse of patent rights,a series of low-quality patents have been triggered,also known as questionable patents,refer to patents that does not meet the conditions for patent granting or the scope of the patent claim may be too broad,which infringes the legitimate rights and interests of patentee,and also hinders legitimate competition and undermines the social order of economic development.In addition,patent infringement has intensified,the compensation mechanism of patent infringement determined by the court can't effectively solve this questionable,nor can it achieve the predetermined social goals.Therefore,how to effectively explore the generation mechanism of questionable patents and determine the optimal compensation mechanism of patent infringement,while improving the quality of patents,can also optimize social welfare,and then build a perfect patent system is imminent.By assuming that there is a positive correlation between the height of invention and R&D investment,this paper establishes the relationship between patent quality and R&D investment,and then endogenous quality of patent is realized.Then,through a duopoly game model,this paper analyzes R&D investment,patent licensing behavior of innovative firm and the strategic choice of potential infringement firm under different situation,and then compares and analyzes the quality of patents and social welfare under different situation,and determine the compensation mechanism of patent infringement that are most conductive to social goals,and further optimize the patent system.Therefore,this paper mainly has the following aspects: First,What factors affect the quality of patents? How do these factors affect manufacturer behavior and profits? Second,How do different compensation mechanisms of patent infringement affect patent quality and social welfare? Can the patent system be further optimized?The results show that,first,the patent quality is affected by the deterministic height of the invention and the efficiency of research and development.When the market demands for deterministic height of the invention are high,or the R&Defficiency of related innovation activities is low,the patent innovative manufacturers may provide questionable patents.Second,in the non-infringement situation,the quality of patents in the monopoly market is better,but the social welfare is worse;in the infringement situation,the quality of patents under the unjust-enrichment doctrine is better as a whole.And the social welfare is better when the R&D efficiency is high,but worse when the R&D efficiency is low.Third,no patent quality and social welfare under the infringement mechanism of patent compensation reach the optimal level,and the court should adopt different infringement mechanism of patent compensation according to different social objectives.If the objective of the court is to optimize social welfare,the court should adopt the unjust-enrichment doctrine and the merger behavior in the market should be actively resisted.If the objective of the court is to improve the quality of patent,a single compensation mechanism of patent infringement may be difficult to achieve the desired effect,and the court needs to use the two kinds of compensation mechanism of patent infringement,namely the unjust-enrichment doctrine and the lost-royalty doctrine.When significant innovation is easy,the unjust-enrichment doctrine should be given priority.When significant innovation is difficult,the lost-royalty doctrine should be given priority.