The Disclosure Of Rational Information In Inside Trading

In this paper,we focus on three models of rational disclosure of insider trading with their market characteristics.First,we study an insider trading model on rational information disclosure in which some outsiders have no information on risk assets,and prove the existence of the linear Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,consisting of an effective pricing rule and an optimal insider trading strategy.It shows that if outsiders do not have their own private information,then the rational strategy of the insider is not to disclose any private information to outsiders.Secondly,on the basis of the previous model,we study an insider trading model in which the insider discloses private information to multiple outsiders who have some private information on risky assets.And we establish the existence of the linear Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,give some sufficient conditions for insider to disclose information rationally,and discuss the market depth in the equilibrium.Further,we explore the influence of correlation of interference signals of risk assets leaked by the insider on insider trading.It shows that in the equilibrium,the independence or correlation between leaked signals do affect the maximum profit of insiders and that there is no absolute advantage in the way of leakage of information;in order to obtain the maximum profit,it is necessary to decide which way to leak information according to the actual situation.