Research On Regulating Effect Of Corporate Governance On Innovation Efficiency

18th Communist Party of China National Congress established the development strategy of establishing an innovative country.As the main body of the national economy,the innovation input and the innovation efficiency of the enterprise have key influences to the national innovation strategy.Schumpeter(1942)argues that innovation is an entrepreneurial creative destruction,a combination of innovative elements,and institutional design is most important in factor combinations.Corporate governance as the basis of enterprise system,affects the efficiency of innovation by resource allocation.At the same time,the difference of marketing environment will affect the effect of innovative mechanisms of corporate governance,thus affecting the efficiency of innovation investment.Based on this,this paper takes the listed companies of R&D information disclosed by Shenzhen and Shanghai A shares in 2010-2015 as the research samples,discusses the innovation effect of corporate innovation and the innovation efficiency of listed companies in the labor-intensive,capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries from the perspective of innovation factors.Specifically,the papers focus on the relationship between innovation input(including R&D investment and technical staff input)and output in different types of industries.Which kind of corporate governance could be better to promote output? What is the role of corporate governance in the transformation of innovation and output? Finally,according to the results of empirical research,this paper puts forward corporate governance structures and optimizing strategies of governance behavior in different types of industries.The first chapter of this paper is the introductory part.This chapter focuses on the research background,purpose,research methods and research framework of this paper.The second chapter is the theoretical basis and the literature review part.Based on the theories of dual principal-agent theory,Innovation theory and other theories,this paper combs the related literatures of industry differentiation,Corporate governance and innovation.Chapter 3analyzes listed companies ' status of innovation input and output.This chapter divides the enterprises into three types of labor-intensive,capital-intensive and technology-intensive.Based on the specific industry and the classified industry,the chapter analyzes the status of innovation input and output respectively.The fourth chapter analyzes the mechanism of action.This paper extracts the key elements by clarifying the mechanism of corporate governance innovation input and output and in this way,the impact of corporate governance on corporate innovation will be described more clearly and can be quantitatively analyzed.Chapter 5 is an empirical study on the regulation of corporate governance and innovation efficiency.This chapter explores the relationship between the enterprise innovation input and output in different industries by stata panel data regression analysis,and analyzes the regulation effect of the ownership structure and the mechanism of incentives,through the robustness test to verify the stability and scientificity of results.The sixth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis,and further puts forward relevant policy suggestions to improve the company's control and improve the innovation efficiency of Chinese enterprises.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:First,there is a positive role between innovation input and output.By increasing investment,whether R&D investment or innovative talent investment can effectively promote the enterprise innovation output.That means funds and human capital as important efficient method of business innovation,are playing their positive significance in the implementation of enterprise innovation strategy.And enterprises should also consciously through these two aspects to enhance innovation.Second,the ownership concentration and the equity checks and balances are negative related to the innovation output of the enterprise.It shows that with the continuous improvement of corporate governance,the excessive holding of large shareholders and the balance of small and medium shareholders are not conducive to innovation and output and also lose regulatory effect between innovative input and output."A dominant" will be a wrong choice for enterprises,and the optimal shareholding ratio needs to be determined by the specific business situation.Thirdly,no matter what type of industry,executive incentive always has a positive correlation with the innovation output of the enterprise,and plays a very important positive adjustment effect in the input and output,and plays an active role in the innovation transformation.This shows that the incentive to executives,both equity and pay can promote executives more concerned about the long-term interests of enterprises in the decision-making;once the enterprise has invested the relevant funds and human capital,motivated executives are more motivated to promote the conversion of these inputs into outputs.Fourth,with the further development of professional institutional investors,investors plays an increasingly important role in the strategic decision of the enterprise,and also plays an important role in the enterprise innovation.The regression results show that the institutional investors play a negative regulatory effect,which may be our institutional investors mainly consider the enterprise as a means of investment,and even as a short-term investment means,which led to it did not play positive effect in the company's decision-making which should have.Fifthly,private enterprises have always been regarded as important active forces of innovation in China,and also get active attention because of their high degree of innovation,but in in the regression analysis of this paper,we found that private holdings ' positive adjustment effect is not significant,especially for China's labor-intensive enterprises,it even played a significant negative adjustment effect,which may be due to China's labor-intensive listed companies is mainly state-owned enterprises.Private enterprises is more innovative or concentrated in the technology-intensive enterprise.This paper through empirical analysis,found that industries of different types have different innovation situation.Enterprises should choose corporate governance structure based on the industry environment and case-by-case,everything from reality,so as to better promote enterprise innovation.