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Compensation Regulation,Perks And Corporate Performance

Posted on:2016-08-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W W LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330542457506Subject:Accounting
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With the pushing of the reform of China enterprise system,the compensation system of managers is exploring constantly.Government has issued rigid "Compensation Regulation"file to limit managers' salary,as well as controlled official corruption and high perks.The people start to thinking the managers' hidden income rationally.Perks is a key form of hidden income.What is the economic consequences of the managers' hidden income?What perks can effect on the corporate performance?Whether Compensation Regulation impacts the economic effects of perks?These problems have been explored by scholars gradually.At present,Chinese managers in the enterprises have a certain amount of perks is bound to exist,when management salaries lower than expected,perks as a way to motivate managers to work hard can play the role to enhance the corporate performance?Or merely seen the-job consumption to a serious agency problems,whether future salary structure contain perks as an important way?We can not negate an incentive,how to formulate relevant policies and the companies' internal system is the direction for future research.This paper uses the disclosed financial data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A listed companies about 2010-2013years.Comparative analysis and empirical analysis are used to explore the impact of Compensation Regulation and the intensity of Compensation Regulation for the economic effect about the perks.The perks of SOE showed a significant efficiency effect,rather than Non-state-owned enterprises 'efficiency effect is not significant.Compensation Regulation play an important role in stimulating perks'efficiency At the same time,we found that the efficiency of the central state-owned enterprises role in corporate performance is stronger than the local state-owned enterprises on holding job consumption.Perks' rationality increases with the intensity of Compensation Regulation changes,likely to cause the agent problems enhanced,and the efficiency of pecuniary weakened.Different from domestic negative views of perks,the empirical results of this study show that pecuniary have a positive effect on company performance in state-owned enterprises under Compensation Regulation.This conclusion is consistent with the theory of manager incentives,thereby avoiding the contradiction about Chinese scholars have recognized the perks as a incentives but then as a negative role in improve the economic.This paper provides a theoretical research foundation for perks reform and salary system reform in China.
Keywords/Search Tags:Compensation Regulation, the intensity of Compensation Regulation, perks, corporate performance
PDF Full Text Request
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