Research On Corporate Performance From The Perspective Of Perks

The phenomenon that the executives of China’s listed company use their authority to seek excessive perquisite compensation caused widespread public concern in our society, the opportunistic behavior that managers abuse their privileges for obtaining self-interest has been denounced constantly, the government has introduced a series of policies and regulations to restrict the perquisite compensation in state-owned enterprises.Because the executive compensation itself has characteristics of hidden and difficult for quantitative research, in the past few research focused on it. Moreover, for academic origin and economic nature of on-the-job compensation, there isn’t an unified conclusion:some scholars believe that compensation is a form of agency costs; while other scholars proposed on-the-job compensation stimulating. Therefore, the systematical research for the impact of China’s listed corporation executive compensation on company performance, has a very important theoretical and practical significance to reduce the listed corporation executives moral risk, improve the governance mechanisms of listed corporation, thus improve company performance.On the basis of domestic and foreign research results of executive compensation, this paper combines the changing constraints of executive compensation in our country in recent years, propose hypothesis which accord with the reality of our country. Using the financial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies during the year of 2010-2012 as the study sample, this paper empirically studies the executive compensation in state-owned enterprise and private enterprise by using an appropriate econometric model and explore the determinants of executive compensation and economic consequence on company performance. The company performance model in this paper can largely explain the executive compensation behavior, and get some conclusions that coincide with our actual situation.This paper’s main research innovation is reflected in the following aspects:1. Combing the fact that the government has introduced a series of supervisions and measures which aimed at restraining the state-owned enterprises executive compensation, this paper discusses the different effects that the government supervisions and constraints on state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. On the basis of existed results, this paper takes the rate of management costs and the ratio of return on assets as the substitute variables of executive compensation and enterprise performance respectively, then selects the proper control variables, projects the model which can strongly explain the perquisite compensation and its influence on state-owned and private-owned companies.2. Taking the related data of Chinese listed companies during the year of 2010-2012, this paper uses the perquisite compensation influence model to study the effects of perquisite compensation on enterprise performance empirically. The results show as follows:the perquisite compensation in private enterprises has a significantly negative effect on performance, while the perquisite compensation in state-owned enterprises does not significantly reduce the enterprise performance.3. Taking the financial data in the year of 2010-2012,after implementing the new accounting standards in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listed company as the research sample. The results show that the executives’monetary payment, enterprise scale, financial leverage,dividend distribution, staff wages, the nature of the industry, regional property could significantly influence the manager’s executive compensation. And, in private enterprises, employee wages has a significantly positive effect on executive compensation, while in state-owned enterprises, the result is not significant. Finally, in both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, dividend distribution has significant negative correlation with executive compensation, and the effect in private enterprises is larger.4. Taking the financial data,which implemented the new accounting standards in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of listing Company as the research sample, this paper distinguishes the different economic performance of executive compensation between the samples in state-owned company and private company under different conditions, this paper enriches the empirical research literature on executive compensation; meanwhile, this paper unifies the perspective of agency and efficiency view on executive compensation together so that enhances the rational explanation for the general exists of executive compensation.