Government Shareholders,Non-interest Business,and The Performance Of Urban Commercial Banks

China city commercial bank has always been an important part of the commercial banking system.By the end of 2017,the total assets of china city commercial bank exceeded 30 trillion yuan,accounting for more than 12%of banking financial institutions.Tracing the history of the establishment of city commercial banks,government shareholders generally have the strongest ability of controlling shareholders and the largest proportion of shareholding in urban commercial banks,and they have been inextricably linked with the development of city commercial banks.Studies have confirmed that government shareholders have a positive or negative impact on the performance of city commercial banks for reasons such as promotion of local officials,maximization of shareholders' equity,and social benefits.Credit business and local government financing platform are the mechanism of government shareholders' influence on the performance of city commercial banks.At the same time,with the gradual deepening of the "interest-rate marketization" and "financial disintermediation" processes,the development of non-interest businesses that are less associated with traditional credit businesses has entered the research horizon of scholars.However,academic views on the impact of non-interest business on the performance of city commercial banks have not been unified.It has rarely been studied whether non-interest business is used as a channel for government shareholders to influence performance of city commercial banks.Therefore,after the credit business has been confirmed as a channel of tunneling for government shareholders,this paper focuses on the transformational trend—non-interest business,to explore whether government shareholders will have a negative effect on the performance of city commercial banks through non-interest businesses.Based on this,this paper manually collects the micro panel data of 47 city commercial banks as a research sample,introduces the generalized moment estimation method(GMM)into the dynamic panel data model,and empirically tests the relationship among the government shareholders,non-interest businesses,and city commercial banks.The main content includes the following six aspects:First,the influence of government shareholder as the largest shareholder on the proportion of non-interest income of urban commercial banks;Second,the influence of the government shareholder as the first largest shareholder on the degree of income diversification of china city commercial bank;Thirdly,the influence of the shareholding ratio of government shareholder on the proportion of non-interest income;Fourth,the influence of government shareholder's holding ability on the degree of income diversification;Fifth,the influence of the proportion of non-interest income on the performance of urban commercial banks;Sixth,the impact of income diversification on the business performance of city commercial banks.Finally,the proportion of non-interest income and the degree of income diversification are respectively examined of the mediating effect,to verify whether the test results are consistent with the results of the empirical study by testing the regression coefficients of the regression model in order.The research results show that government shareholder as the largest shareholder will reduce the proportion of the non-interest income and diversification of income structure,and the higher the proportion of the government shareholder shares,the stronger the holding capacity,the lower the proportion of non-interest income and the lower degree of diversification;The relationship between the proportion of non-interest income and the bank performance is not significant,but the diversification of income structure will improve the bank performance.The empirical results validate the transmission mechanism of government shareholders' influence on the performance of city commercial banks through non-interest income.At present,urban commercial banks are in urgent need of business transformation under the impact of interest narrowing spreads,competition from peers and internet financial platforms.Under the premise that government shareholders have been confirmed to generate "empty"behaviors on city commercial banks through non-interest-related businesses,the relevant regulatory authorities should focus on reducing the proportion of government shareholders holding shares,and the development of non-interest business.It is necessary to guard against operational risks and avoid excessive intervention by government shareholders to further improve the internal management mechanism.At the same time,Urban commercial bank should combine its own resource advantages and local economic development characteristics to diversify its businesses so as to improve the performance of city commercial banks.