Research On The Influence Of The Heterogeneity Of Manager Independence On The Quality Of Accounting Information

In recent years,it appears that many listed companies and their executives have been punished by the CSRC or the Ministry of Finance for participating in the disclosure of false accounting information.In June 2015,the IPO financial fraud case of Jia Yu shares was exposed,27 directors,supervisors and senior management of the company were punished accordingly,Tian Jiayu,the former chairman of the company,was banned from the market.The case of Jia Yu shares exposed the seriousness of the false accounting information of Chinese listed companies and also exposed the weakness of the monitor power for the quality of accounting information,it is noteworthy that the integrated model of general manager and actual controller of Jiayu shares become one of the fiery initiators of accounting information.As the business investors and managers possess asymmetric information,for the stakeholders in the enterprise that do not participate in the operation of the enterprise,their mastery of the state of the enterprise directly affects their relevant decision-making and all this depends largely on the quality of the accounting information released by the listed company's financial information and accounting statements,therefore,the quality of accounting information for the protection of corporate creditors and the legitimate rights and interests of shareholders is of great significance.Therefore,based on the research on the current status of relevant literature both at home and abroad,this paper conducts relevant theoretical and empirical tests,this article analyzes the data of 2280 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in2014-2016,uses empirical results to support the conclusions.First of all,according to the relevant conclusions of the study of Liu Shaobo,Ma Chao(2016)on the heterogeneity of independence degree of the manager,proposed the concept of heterogeneity of manager independence degree and three kinds of classification(the same type,the affiliated type and the independent type)as well as the quality of accounting information and measurement,on this basis,according to principal-agent theory and contract theory,further theoretical analysis and empirical test of the influence of heterogeneity of independence degree of the manager on the quality of accounting information are conducted.Secondly,the heterogeneity of manager's independence degree after considering two adjustment variables: equity concentrationand salary level of senior executives,according to information asymmetry theory,high order theory and human capital theory,respectively,the theoretical analysis and empirical test of the adjustment of ownership structure as well as the theoretical analysis and empirical test of the adjustment of compensation level.Next,the conclusions of the study are put forward based on the empirical test results and policy recommendations are put forward from following three aspects: independence of manager,ownership concentration and salary level of senior executives.This study found that: the heterogeneity of managers' independence degree is positively correlated with the quality of accounting information,senior management salary level have some inhibitory effect on the positive relationship between the two,ownership concentration has an important reinforcing effect on the positive relationship between the two.On the one hand,the conclusion of this paper enriches the research results of related literatures and theories,it provides a brand new perspective for the study of heterogeneity and the quality of accounting information.On the other hand,the conclusion of this paper is of great significance for improving the quality of accounting information and protecting the interests of investors by improving the degree of independence of managers,optimizing the structure of ownership structure,and rationally designing executive compensation incentives.