Manager Independence,Executive Compensation And Corporate Performance

Enterprise performance is a comprehensive performance of the company in a certain period of time,and is the focus of shareholders and operators.The general manager,as the “leader” of the operator,will have a personal impact on his or her daily business decisions,which in turn will have an important impact on business performance.The selection of a general manager with excellent quality and outstanding ability is of great significance to the sustainable operation of the company.Therefore,the general manager's employment source directly affects its quality and ability,which is an important issue worthy of attention.At present,the general manager's selection method is roughly the majority shareholder(or his family members)concurrently,the major shareholder appointed,the market candidate,and so on.The degree of independence of the general manager arising from different options will vary.Does this difference in independence have a significant impact on business performance? This paper studies this issue and is of great significance for optimizing the selection of general managers and improving business performance.Based on the review of related literatures at home and abroad,this paper conducts relevant theoretical and empirical research on the above issues.From 2013 to 2016,China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies are selected as research samples,and theoretical analysis and empirical tests are carried out on the above issues..First of all,according to the conclusions of Liu Shaobo and Ma Chao(2016)on the degree of managerial independence heterogeneity,this paper puts forward the concept of the degree of independence of the general manager.Based on the theory of principal-agent theory,the author analyzes the influence of the degree of independence of the general manager on the performance of the company by focusing on the leader of the manager group-general manager.Secondly,based on the theory of salary incentives and the perspective of executive compensation,The salary level is the adjustment variable,and the adjustment of the salary level to the relationship between the degree of independence of the general manager and the performance of the company;again,based on the theory of the tournament and the theory of fairness,the salary gap is introduced as the adjustment variable,and the degree of independence of the salary gap is analyzed.In the final analysis,based on theoretical analysis and empirical results,the general man-ager selection mechanism is proposed from the aspects of general manager's independence degree,salary level and salary gap,and effective policy incentives and policy recommendations for promoting enterprise performance are established.The results of this paper show that:(1)There is a positive correlation between the degree of independence of the general manager and the performance of the company.That is to say,the degree of independence of the general manager has a positive impact on the performance of the company.The selection of a more independent general manager is conducive to improving the performance of the company.(2)The internal compensation gap inhibits the positive correlation between the degree of independence of the general manager and the performance of the company to a certain extent.That is to say,in the case of a small internal compensation gap,the degree of independence of the general manager has a positive impact on corporate performance.Appropriate reduction of the internal compensation gap is conducive to promoting the improvement of corporate performance.(3)The salary level has a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between the degree of independence of the general manager and the performance of the company.That is,when the salary level is high,the degree of independence of the general manager has a positive impact on the performance of the company.Raising executive compensation levels will help improve corporate performance.On the one hand,the research conclusions of this paper enrich the relevant literature and theoretical research results,and provide a new perspective for the related research of enterprise performance;on the other hand,improve the independence of the general manager by optimizing the general manager selection method of listed companies,and Reasonable design of executive compensation incentives to improve corporate performance has important implications.