A Study Of The Impact Of Affiliated Management On The Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure In Listed Companies

Since the reform and opening up,China's capital market has been flourishing.The listed companies can get more financial support in the capital market.Disclosing accounting information to investors is an important way to get their trust.Due to our imperfect regulatory measures for the disclosure of accounting information,there are times when listed companies make false statements and intentionally conceal the development dilemma when disclosing accounting information.Such acts may seriously mislead the capital market investor.Especially for small inves tors with weak funds and lack of professional knowledge,it is easy to become a victim of accounting information disclosure quality supervision because of investment failure.Therefore,it is very important to explore the influencing factors of accounting information disclosure quality in order to protect small and medium-sized investors and safeguard the healthy development of capital market.Among the many influencing factors,the control of the large shareholders to the listed companies is very important and can not be ignored.Most of the ownership structure of C hinese enterprises are high concentration,the large shareholders themselves are the senior executives of listed companies or those who will be appointed to the listed companies by the staff of t he major shareholders to control a listed company,which is the common means of controlling the listed companies.To explore the possible influence of the above phenomenon on the quality of accounting information disclosure,this paper is based on the research of zheng gao ping(2011).Affiliated management is defined as "the general manager or the chairman himself is the largest shareholder or the actual controller" or "the general manager or the chairman assumes the position of the largest shareholder's company or the actual controller's company",the influence on the quality of accounting information disclosure is studied.Because the role played by the general manager and the chairman in corporate governance is different.Is there any difference in the quality of accounting information disclosure between large shareholders when they are general managers or the chairman? Further,is there any difference in the impact on the quality of accounting information disclosure between state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises?In order to explore the above three issues,this study took the Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies as the research sample,from 2010 to 2016 as the research deadline.By using the Ordered Logistic method to establish the model,the following conclusions:(1)Affiliated management is negatively related to the quality of accounting information disclosure;(2)The large shareholder serves as the chairman of the board and the large shareholder serves as the general manager are both negatively related to the quality of accounting information disclosure,the large shareholder serves as the general manager and has a stronger negative correlation with the quality of accounting information disclosure;(3)In state-owned enterprises,it is not significant that the influence of affiliated management on the quality of accounting information disclosure,in private-owned enterprises affiliated management has more negative relationship with the quality of accounting information disclosure.The conclusion of this study confirms that affiliated management is not conducive to improving the quality of accounting information disclosure,at the same time,this study enriches the research on the influencing factors of accounting information disclosure quality,expands the economic consequences of affiliated management and also contributes new theoretical guidance for the listed companies to optimize corporate governance structure.In order to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure,an enterprise should reasonably restrain the super-power of large shareholders,maintain the independence of large shareho lders in listed companies and try to avoid large shareholders through the part-time executives to manipulate the disclosure of accounting information to mislead investors,exploitation of small and medium shareholders,through the listed companies to control private interests.