| With the completion of non-tradable shares reform and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,there are more and more listed companies in China forming a structure of multiple large shareholders(MLS).As the core of corporate governance,whether the ownership structure is reasonably arranged will directly affect the level of corporate governance,and the level of corporate governance will affect the quality of enterprise accounting information.Existing studies have paid attention to the impact of equity concentration and equity balances on the quality of enterprise accounting information,but ignored the impact of the MLS on the quality of enterprise accounting information.Because the degree of earnings management can not directly represent the quality of enterprise accounting information,this paper believes that the financial restatement of enterprises can more directly represent the quality of enterprise accounting information.Therefore,from the perspective of financial restatement,this paper explores the impact of MLS on the quality of enterprise accounting information.For enterprises with MLS,if other large shareholders can effectively supervise the self-interest behavior of controlling shareholders and managers,it will help to improve the internal governance of enterprises and improve the quality of accounting information.If other large shareholders and controlling shareholders conspire to manipulate financial figures for their own interests,the quality of accounting information may be reduced.Therefore,how will the MLS affect the quality of enterprise accounting information? How does it will make an impact? These are still problems worthy of in-depth discussion.Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as the research objects,from the perspective of enterprise financial restatement,this paper empirically tests the impact of the MLS on the quality of enterprise accounting information and the role of enterprise’s internal and external governance mechanism.The empirical results show that:(1)with the MLS,the collusion of large shareholders reduces the quality of enterprise accounting information,which is reflected in improving the probability of financial restatement and increasing the disclosure lag of financial restatement;(2)the MLS’s effect of reducing the quality of accounting information is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises;(3)a good internal and external governance mechanism(high board independence and high analyst attention)can effectively curb the negative impact of the MLS on the quality of enterprise accounting information.Based on the research conclusions,this paper puts forward some suggestions for enterprises on optimizing the ownership structure and improving the quality of accounting information.Government departments and regulatory authorities should further improve the information disclosure system and shorten the time lag for enterprises to disclose restated reports.They should also improve the attention to the quality of accounting information of non-state-owned enterprises with the coexistence structure of multiple major shareholders.Moreover,they should promote enterprises to improve the independent director system;promote the establishment of a reasonable analyst evaluation system,improve the number of listed companies tracked by analysts and the quality of analysis reports.The research of this paper completely discusses the impact of the MLS on the quality of accounting information,makes it clear that the reason for the MLS to reduce the quality of enterprise accounting information is the collusion of large shareholders,and reveals a new potential dark side of the MLS.In terms of theory,this paper is of certain significance to enrich the literature on the economic consequences of MLS and the literature on the factors affecting the quality of accounting information.In practice,this paper is of great significance for enterprises to optimize ownership structure,improve the quality of accounting information and protect the investors’ interests. |