Research On The Influence Of Independent And Sensible Local Job On The Investment Efficiency Of Enterprises

Investment is the basis for a company to survive.The efficiency of investment is directly related to the investment decisions of an enterprise,and directly affects the life and death of an enterprise.However,the investment of enterprises is not always effective due to various factors.Excessive investment and insufficient investment often happen.Independent directors have been paid much attention to the protection of investors' interests in China's capital market because of their own "independence".The introduction of independent directors in the corporate governance structure will inevitably have an important impact on corporate governance,and it will also affect the efficiency of enterprise investment.An effective independent director system can improve corporate governance.The rational structure will naturally improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.Independent directors of independent directors,because of their own advantages in the distance,compared with the independent directors in the field,local independent directors are easier to obtain information outside the financial statements of the listed companies,play the role of supervision and strategy,and help the board make more scientific investment decisions.Moreover,the local independent directors have too much time and energy to invest in the corporate governance,which can reduce the agency cost to a certain extent,so as to improve the efficiency of the enterprises.This paper selects the A shares listed companies in China's capital market for2012-2016 years as the research sample,and empirically analyses the influence of the independent directors on the investment efficiency of the listed companies by the multiple regression analysis method.The study found that the local independent board of directors had a significant impact on the investment efficiency of the enterprises.The results showed that:(1)there was a significant positive correlation between the local employment of independent directors and the efficiency of investment,the higher the number and proportion of local independent directors,the higher the investment efficiency.(2)in terms of two different forms of inefficiency investment(overinvestment and underinvestment),it is found that local independent directors have obvious restraining effect on overinvestment,but the inhibition effect on underinvestment is not significant.(3)under different property rights,the restraining effect of local independent directors on excessive investment in non-state-owned enterprises is higher than that of local independent independent directors on overinvestment.The empirical results in this paper provide help for listed companies to establish a more scientific independent director system.