The Research On The Protection Of The Interests Of Small And Medium Investors Under The Semi-compulsory Dividend Policy

In order to protect the interests of investors,the China Securities Regulatory Commission regards "maintaining the market open,just,fair,and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of investors,especially small and medium-sized investors,and promoting the healthy development of the capital market " as an important goal of supervision.However,the fact that listed companies infringe the interests of small and medium investors still exists.On the one hand,some listed companies have the phenomenon of no dividends and low dividends.On the other hand,major shareholders will use the advantages of control to capture corporate profits.In 2008,the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the semi-mandatory dividend policy of“ Decision on Revising Several Provisions of Cash Dividends of Listed Companies”,which is the first quantitative regulation of corporate refinancing and cash dividend levels,that is,a necessary condition for an enterprise to obtain eligibility for refinancing is that the cumulative cash dividend ratio must reach 30% of the three-year distributable profit.Then,does the implementation of the "semi-enforced policy" increase the overall cash flow of listed companies? Does it cause the company to push back the proportion of dividends in order to meet the financing standards,and thus the phenomenon of inhibiting dividends? Is it effective for companies that fail to meet financing standards? And whether it inhibits the large shareholder's current position?The above issues are studied in order to test the effectiveness of semi-mandatory dividend distribution policies,and to improve the regulatory policies for the dividend distribution of listed companies in China,and provide empirical evidence for the protection of investors' interests.This article takes the A-share listed company from 2001 to 2015 as a sample,with the present level as an explanatory variable,introducing policy variables,profitability,ability to borrow,and the proportion of shares held by the top ten shareholders as explanatory variables,And the refinancing and the interactive items of profitability,ability to borrow,and shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders were introduced into the equations for experimental design.The Tobit model was used for regression research and the following conclusions were drawn:First,the policy coefficient was significantly negative,indicating that the overall level of the listed companies after the implementation of the "semi-enforced policy" waslower than before the "decision" was implemented,and the effect of the implementation of the policy was not satisfactory;Second,the coefficient of interactions between refinancing and profitability is significantly negative,and the sum of the coefficient of profitability itself is still negative.Demonstrated that the refinancing demand makes the profitability of listed companies,there have been adverse selection of dividends to meet.This means that high-profit companies will reduce the level of dividends,cater to "semi-enforcement policies",implement "threshold" dividends,and behave less than their ability to pay dividends;Third,the company's borrowing capacity coefficient is significantly negative,and the interaction coefficient between the borrowing ability and the refinancing demand is positive but not significant.It shows that the "semi-enforcement policy" is ineffective for companies that have refinancing and high debt,that is,companies with refinancing needs and high debts will not significantly qualify for refinancing by raising the level of distribution;Fourth,the coefficient of the top ten shareholders of the company is significantly positive,and the coefficient of interaction between the top ten shareholders and refinancing needs is not significant.It shows that this policy does not bind the majority shareholder cash problem.That is to say,for some companies with high dividends,the“semi-enforcement policy”only sets a lower limit for dividends,which cannot effectively curb the problem of cash withdrawal by large shareholders.According to the research conclusions,the relevant policy recommendations include: not only to obtain refinancing qualifications to develop the mandatory standards for dividends,but also to formulate dividend “compulsory” standards based on the actual operating conditions of listed companies.As well as improving corporate governance,we should appropriately consider the maximum limit of dividends to prevent large shareholders from taking the current position,and protect the immediate interests of small and medium-sized investors.