Managerial Risk Preference?audit Quality And Earnings Management

Earnings management is an eternal topic that has attracted the attention of scholars in the industry during the development of listed companies.This behavior not only seriously damages the corporate image and affects the measurement and evaluation of corporate value,but also has a significant impact on the decisions of other investors and information users.As the management decision maker,the level of managerial risk preference will influence the enterprise's decision-making result.The final result is presented in the financial statements.When the decision-making fails,will the management perform earnings manipulation for whitewashing the report? Do they have more earnings management to gain personal benefits and go against the company's overall goals? Existing theoretical studies still question this issue.In addition,in recent years fraudulent fraud has been exposed one by one,people more and more concern about the requirements of audit quality.As an intermediary institution with strong independence,the accounting firm fulfills its agency responsibilities and constantly supervises and controls the quality of the company's financial information,which has an important influence in the development process of the company.However,most of the current literature directly studies the relationship between risk appetite and earnings management or firm audit quality and company earnings management,and neglects the regulatory role of firm audit quality between risk appetite and earnings management.Therefore,from the micro perspective of management risk appetite,this paper studies it as a mechanism for the management of earnings.At the same time,it profoundly analyzes the regulatory role of firm audit quality in the relationship between risk appetite and corporate earnings management.Based on the research results of the existing literature,this paper analyzes the relationship between risk preference and transaction audit quality and earnings management at home and abroad,and discusses the impact of audit quality on the relationship between the two.Combining with China's actual situation,this paper defines the core concepts and related basic theories of this study,and puts forward the hypothesis of empirical analysis of this paper.This paper takes the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2016 as a sample,and builds a regression model of management risk preference and earnings quality,and a regression model of the audit quality of the firm's regulatory role,and analyzes in depth the risk appetite for earnings management of listed companies.Impact the audit quality of the firm's role in regulating the relationship between them.After research,it was found that the higher the level of managerial risk preference,the easier it is to conduct more earnings manipulation behaviors.The greater the degree of earnings management of the company is,that is,the positive correlation between the two;After adding the adjustment variable,the audits quality weakens the positive correlation between management's risk appetite and earnings management,which plays a regulatory role.This means that the higher the audit quality,the easier it is to suppress the management of risk management for earnings management.The paper examines the level of managerial risk preference from the individual and company levels,studies the correlation between it and earnings management,and adds auditing quality adjustment factors to the firm to enrich relevant theoretical research.In addition,it has certain significance for improving the corporate governance mechanism of our country,strengthening internal and external supervision,and helping other investors to make decisions.