A Study On The Voluntary Disclosure And Supervision Of Listed Companies

Contemporary study on voluntary disclosure relies mainly on empirical study into listed companies and industries as a whole.The majority of current voluntary disclosure researches are carried out through the idea and method as follows: take advantage of typical index from annual report or existing index of research institution,and establish the index system for voluntary disclosure.However,existing researches are more or less deficient in index standard and data collection.This thesis,based on previous researches and combined with the case of Baoli International,a listed company on the Growth Enterprise Market(GEM)of Shenzhen Stock Exchange,gives a case study on the voluntary disclosure of Baoli International.Furthermore,this thesis extends its range towards other GEM stocks and other listed companies of the same category(Chemical Raw Material and Chemical Products),in order to improve the method of voluntary disclosure evaluation and provide reference for supervision of departments concerned.Firstly,this thesis summarizes current articles on the analysis of voluntary disclosure and multiple approaches of the evaluation of voluntary disclosure.This thesis points out that various factors exist to affect the quality and risk of voluntary disclosure.For the accuracy and effectiveness of voluntary disclosure evaluation,interim reports are not suitable for direct research because of its diversified forms.Nor are evaluation results from rating agencies or single factor.Instead,a number of indicators need discovering within annual reports for further evaluation.This thesis discuss methods of the evaluation of disclosure quality afterwards.To find out indicators that are able to reveal the information disclosure risk of Baoli through comparison,this thesis take as example 47 GEM stocks with similar industry and market position to Baoli for research,which reduces disturbance from other indicators as much aspossible.Considering similar listed companies are chosen for comparative studies,this thesis do not use indicators,which lack enough discriminative power as company size or duration time.For effective comparisons,this thesis do not adopt indicators which various companies are seldom one and same,such as corporate culture or social responsibilities.This thesis,referring to past researches,use several quantitative indicators from annual financial reports,and rank Baoli and other samples by these indicators.If Baoli ranks in extreme positions rather than around average ones,this suggests that this indicator can effectively judge the voluntary information disclosure risk of listed companies.Finally,this thesis compares data among 3 years to ensure the indicators after screening could reflect long-run rules,while those do not show as such in all years will not stay.This thesis finds out that Baoli shows significant difference through factors as receivable turnover,inventory turnover,ROA,ROE and annual growth of total assets from comparable companies,which are able to evaluate voluntary disclosure risks.After the discussion of the specification and evaluation method of voluntary disclosure,this thesis also discusses about supervision of it.Modern Chinese capital market,in its short history,has equipped with relatively complete laws on information disclosure.The regulator concerned has been in effect.At the same time,owing to the specification of voluntary disclosure,the supervision of it is directive and lacking in specific rules under current Chinese supervision system,regardless of administrative agencies and industry organizations.According to Securities Law,listed companies and executives are regulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC),which is usually form over substance and serves mainly for the lawsuits from minority investors.The punishment is also too light to alarm listed companies and executives.Besides,it takes ages to go through current steps for administrative penalty and fail to take effect in time.To sum up,this thesis suggests the addition of format requirements for voluntary disclosure as interim disclosure.Regular evaluation of disclosure risks through indicators of Baoli and adjustment with the change of industry and law,heavier punishment with feasibility against disclosure irregularities and penalty according to actual loss or else to alarm others,and finally,the reduction of time before punishment,are also mentioned.