Research On The Financing Of Small And Medium Enterprises In China Under The Internet Financial Model

The financing of small and medium-sized enterprises has been an important research problem in China,even the world.By the 2017,China's SMEs account for more than 99% of the total number of enterprises in the country,it is an important part of China's national economy,but in the financial institutions of RMB loans,SME loans accounted for only 33% of total business loans,and there was a serious problem of credit rationing.Among the various problems faced by the development of SMEs in China,the financing problem accounts for 69.2%,indicating that most SMEs will encounter financing difficulties.The internet finance plays a significant role in alleviating the information asymmetry,reducing financing costs,and enriching financing channels in the financing process of SMEs.This paper mainly studies the financing problem of SMEs in China under the Internet Financial Mode,aiming to study the role of Internet Finance in SME financing,and provide policy recommendations for solving the problem of SME financing.The dissertation takes the information asymmetry in the financing of Chinese SMEs as the starting point of research,and divides the problem of information asymmetry into two parts: information asymmetry before lending and information asymmetry after lending.The route of the paper is as follows: from investigating the causes of the financing difficulties of SMEs,to researching the ways and models of Internet finance to ease the financing of SMEs,and to prove the role of the innovation model of Internet finance in alleviating the financing of SMEs,and providing policy recommendations to solve the financing problems of small enterprises in China.Through the bank-enterprise game method under the traditional financial system,this paper proves that the information asymmetry in the financing process and the imperfection of the penalty and restriction system for corporate default are the financing difficulties.Taking the SME financing activities in the P2 P online lending platform as the background,using the Signaling Game model to explore the role of Internet finance in solving the problem of pre-loan information asymmetry,and then using the Repeated game model to reduce the risk of SMEs default after lending.The model proves that Internet finance collects information of various channels of SMEs and their representatives through big data technology,analyzes the repayment ability and credit rating of enterprises with a risk control model,which effectively mitigates the problem of information asymmetry in SME financing;the credit information system has great deterrent effect on the untrustworthy behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises.The credit incentive mechanism can guide enterprises to improve their credibility,attract more creditworthy small and medium-sized enterprises to enter the financing market,reduce loan risks,and maintain the healthy operation of financing market.According to the model,the Internet Financial Platform improves the big data risk control,strengthens the disclosure of corporate credit information,establishes a credit information system and credit incentive mechanism with a high degree of information sharing,and continuously improves the risk pricing model in accordance with the financing history with regard to interest rates,credit limits,etc.The rational allocation of financing parameters and other methods can effectively alleviate information asymmetry,reduce financing risks,and solve the financing difficulties of SMEs.