Research On The Influence Of Accounting Conservatism To Non-Efficiency Investment Based On Ownership Structure

As one of the major financial decisions of modern enterprises,investment is a driving force for the development of enterprises.Its efficiency is directly related to the rise and fall of enterprises.It is also an important force to promote the sustained growth of national economy.How to improve the investment efficiency of the listed companies and suppress the inefficiency investment behavior is a matter of concern.Accounting conservatism can inhibit the non-efficiency of investment to a certain extent,but the inhibitory effect on the non-efficiency investment decisions of listed companies remains to be determined in reality.Whether the China's special listed company ownership structure can affect accounting conservatism is worth in-depth study.This paper reviewed and commented the related domestic and foreign literature of the equity structure,accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment.On account of the principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory and the free cash flow hypothesis theory,it analyzed the influence of accounting conservatism on non-efficiency investment in China's unique ownership structure.Then this paper proposed assumptions and established relevant empirical models.This paper took 6850 companies as the research objects in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market from 2008 to 2016 years.Using descriptive analysis,correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression analysis method,this paper tested the influence of accounting conservatism on inefficient investment based on ownership structure.The empirical results showed that Chinese listed companies' investment was non-efficiency generally,and the number of underinvested companies was greater than the amount of overinvestment.Accounting conservatism can significantly inhibit non-efficiency investment of the company's capital.Accounting conservatism had obvious promoting effect on under investment,and had obvious inhibitory effects on overinvestment.From the perspective of ownership structure,accounting conservatism can effectively restrain overinvestment and alleviate underinvestment in state-owned listed companies.But this effect was weakened in non-state owned enterprises.The inhibitory effect of accounting conservatism on inefficiency investment decreased with the increase of the largest shareholder's proportion.Then this paper put forward corresponding suggestions and theoretical suggestions for the managers of listed companies to reduce inefficient investment behavior and improve corporate governance structure.It also provided suggestions for policy makers and relevant regulatory authorities.