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Research On The Effect Of Corporate R&D Investment On Excutive Compensation Performance Sensitivity

Posted on:2019-01-08Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330548481866Subject:Accounting
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At present our country is in an important period of economic transformation.In the new normal,the state council driving the strategy of innovation driven new,and take the characteristic independent innovation road.This move indicates that our country realize the importance of innovation for national economic development,the only constant innovation can guarantee the sustained competitiveness,make "made in China" to "wisdom made in China".Enterprise is the main body of innovation,the enterprise managers to master the important strategic decision-making and implementation,to promote the innovation strategy,first to encourage managers to strengthen innovation enterprise.Existing research shows that managers' pay compensation linked to the company's performance is one of the important methods to solve agency conflict,it can make managers pursue their own interests as well as improve the value of the enterprise.But with the increase of the importance of innovation,innovation is a high uncertainty,gains lagged activity,when pay linked to performance,may enable managers to pay down because of poor short-term performance,the result of lower r&d.So the reasonable design of compensation contracts in order to improve the management of innovation will become important topics in academia.In this paper,under the background of the study,enterprise r&d as the breakthrough point,probe into the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance,and further analysis enterprise r&d investment and compensation performance sensitivity of conduction path,explore enterprise risk in the intermediary role between them,to encourage enterprises for independent innovation,improve the corporate governance mechanism provides a theoretical support.This article first to both at home and abroad in recent years has carried on the induction,research methods and conclusions in this paper expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis,to the enterprise r&d investment,enterprise risk,enterprise performance and the relationship between executive compensation are analyzed,put forward in this paper,five hypotheses.To test the relationship between the variables,this article selects 2012-2016 in Shanghai and shenzhen a-share listed companies to disclose the r&d company as the research object,finishing the 6981 observations for screening the empirical test.In this paper,the research content mainly includes:(1)build the OLS regression model to examine the relationship of corporate r&d input and executive pay;(2)inspection enterprise r&d and executive compensation performance sensitivity relationship;(3)test inspection step by step is enterprise risk in r&d and the intermediary role between pay performance sensitivity;(4)the sample distinguish between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises grouping regression,test under different ownership enterprises the relationship between r&d and executive compensation performance sensitivity.In this paper,the study found that:first,the enterprise r&d has a significant positive effect on executive compensation,executive increasing r&d would get higher pay.Second,the enterprise r&d spending on executive pay performance sensitivity have a significant negative impact,enterprise r&d strength increase,inhibits the executive compensation performance sensitivity.Third,r&d investment and enterprise risk,the enterprise research and development activities,will increase the uncertainty of enterprise management,increase the risk of the enterprise.Fourth,enterprise risk in r&d impact on executive compensation performance sensitivity plays an intermediary role,enterprise r&d investment on the negative impact of executive compensation performance sensitivity is through the enterprise risk conduction.Fifth,compared with the state-owned enterprises,the non-state-owned enterprises in r&d input and the negative effect of executive compensation performance sensitivity is stronger.Research conclusion of this paper gives enlightenment to the enterprise innovation,enterprise to design the reasonable compensation contracts,reduce the risk of management in r&d activities cause,encourage the increased investment in research and development,improve the level of enterprise's innovation consciousness and innovation.At the same time according to different ownership of enterprises should be designed according to the actual situation of compensation contracts.
Keywords/Search Tags:enterprise r&d, pay performance sensitivity, enterprise risk, intermediary effect
PDF Full Text Request
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