A Study Of The Impact Of Managerial Power On The Information Disclosure Quality Of Listed Companies

The capital market transmits information by the information disclosure of listed companies chiefly,all stakeholders,such as creditors and shareholders,are based on the disclosure of information,so as to make scientific investment decisions.High quality information disclosure can not only protect the interests of the majority of stakeholders,but also promote the efficiency of China's capital market.At the same time,management plays a vital role in the process of information disclosure related to the company.As the main person in charge of information submission and disclosure,most of the managers of listed companies can easily use their power to influence information disclosed by listed companies,and then have an impact on information users' investment decisions.Therefore,exploring the influence of management power on information disclosure quality is of great theoretical and practical significance for safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders and promoting the orderly development of securities market.The article firstly combed the research literature of the experts and scholars on the management power and the quality of information disclosure.Then,describes the information disclosure quality,management power and other related concepts,the behavioral science theory,information asymmetry theory,upper echelons theory and principal-agent theory,ownership power,structural power,prestige power,political power,expert power a total of five kinds of power as the division of management of power.After analyzing the current status of the management of power distribution from the two angles of time and industry,and the listed company information disclosure level of overall and some illegal phenomenon in-depth analysis,the author explores the various power mechanism of the quality of the information disclosure of listed companies,in order to put forward the hypothesis as the basis.In this paper,the two-element Logistic regression model is constructed to verify the reasonableness of the proposed hypothesis.Finally,based on the model,1244 listed companies in 2014-2016 years were taken as data samples,and the above five hypotheses were analyzed by regression analysis,and some hypotheses were verified.Empirical research shows that the improvement of information disclosure quality of listed companies can be achieved by improving managerial ownership and prestige and power,or by reducing managerial power and structural power.Based on the empirical results,the author suggests that regulatory authorities should strictly regulate the power of management,the listed company should make rational allocation of management power,optimize the management power and strengthen supervision by implementing the two duties separation,perfecting management incentive mechanism,optimizing management appointment mechanism and improving internal governance mechanism.At the same time,managers should also have a correct understanding and rationally use its own power,constantly adjust and standardize their own behavior,and promote the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.