Research On The Effect Of Managerial Power On The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The quality of information disclosure has attracted the attention to the scholars for a long time. Good quality of information disclosure can promote the resource allocation efficiency of the capital market, and reduce the company’s external financing costs. But now, in our country’s securities market, the quality of information disclosure of China’s listed companies is poor due to the distortion of information disclosure and the violation behavior cases, which was fined by the China securities regulatory commission. Aimed at this situation, our government puts forward rules and regulations related to the disclosure of information, but the effect is not obvious, and the illegal and irregular cases of information disclosure are still occurred. Some scholars point out that most of the distortion of information disclosure and illegal cases are caused by the non-standard corporate governance. Most existing literatures study the effect of corporate governance factors on the quality of the information disclosure of listed companies from the perspective of the characteristics of board of directors and board of supervisors and equity structure, and some meaningful conclusions are drawn, but rarely explore information disclosure quality problem from the perspective of the managerial power, and it lacks literatures combined with product market competition. So, in order to provide a theoretical basis for improving the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, this paper studies the effect of the managerial power and product market competition on the quality of information disclosure as well as the effect of product market competition on the relationship between the managerial power and the quality of information disclosure from the perspective of product market competition.This paper firstly analyses the existing related literatures at home and abroad about the managerial power, product market competition as well as the quality of information disclosure, and define the concepts involved in this paper; secondly select China’s listed companies in the Shenzhen stock exchange from 2008 to 2012 as research samples, set up the relational model, and use logistic regression analysis for the empirical test, and study the effect of the managerial power and product market competition on the quality of information disclosure as well as the effect of product market competition on the relationship between the managerial power and the quality of information disclosure; lastly according to the empirical analysis of the results of the research conclusion, put forward policy suggestions and point out the shortage of the research.The results show that:(1) the executives can use their power to affect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies negatively, and the greater the managerial power is, the lower the quality of information disclosure is; further consider the effect of the nature of the property rights of listed companies on the relationship between managerial power and the quality of information disclosure, and after dividing all the samples into two groups, the results show that compared with the non-state-owned holding companies, the state-owned holding companies’ managerial power has more significant effect on it(2) the product market competition has significant positive influence on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, and the quality of information disclosure of listed companies will improve with the enhance of the degree of product market competition;(3) the relationship between the managerial power and the quality of information disclosure is affected by the degree of product market competition, and compared with the companies in a highly competitive industry, the negative influence of the managerial power on the quality of information disclosure is more significant in a low competitive industries, and product market competition plays a role on the managerial power.