The Quality Transaction Mechanism And Incentive Mechanism Of Complex Product Supply Chain Concerning "Profit-reputation"

A complex product(Cop)is the item characterized by high cost and engineering-intensive,and usual produced in small batch to satisfy the individualized requirement[2].The complex system,such as aircraft,warship rocker,or satellite,is highly complexities in product structure,manufacturing processes and management activity.In order to take the advantages of system integration and technologically assemble with full effort,the complex product is organized as a "Main Manufacturer-Suppliers"(M-S)production model,which is a strategic alliance composed of firms around world.Therefore,the success of leading products depends on the quality of the entire supply chain.In the supply chain quality cooperation,the main manufacturer demands that suppliers provide outsourcing systems with high quality,which can improve the quality improvement profits of the main manufacturer gains and increase the production inputs of the supplier.Concerning the cooperative characters of quality cooperation for complex product supply chain,such as oligarchy cooperation,multiple milestones and small batch order,the important methodologies of quality cooperation mechanism and quality incentive measure are investigated.The comprehensive influence of the short-term economic profit and long-term quality reputation are taken into account from the perspective of generalized quality loss.Following are the main domains in this research.(1)The "principle-agent" relationship analysis of complex product supply chain under small batch order.On the basis of quality cooperation processes analysis,the main economic profits and quality assurance cost can be studied.Moreover,the"principle-agent" relationship is explored from the perspective of generalized quality loss,which tamps the research foundation.(2)"Profit-reputation" utility function design and analysis for participants of complex product supply chain.According to different kinds of quality characters,such as the large-the-best type,the small-the-best type and the nominal-the-best type,generalized quality loss is used to change different kinds of quality characters to be standard and dimensionless value.Therefore,the quality reputation should be defined as the weighted sum of all the key quality characters.Concerning economic profits and quality reputation,a Cobb-Douglas utility function is proposed.Furthermore,the influences of parameters are explored and some important properties are developed.(3)The quality cooperation mechanism analysis of complex product supply chain concerning "profit-reputation".Based on "profit-reputation" utility function,two level programming models are built to reveal the equilibrium of mutual beneficial cooperation according to different kinds of cooperation situations.From the perspective of exchange economy,Edgeworth box is utilized to describe the complex product supply chain quality cooperation between a manufacturer and a supplier,and the quality cooperation mechanism is explored.Additionally,programming models are built concerning the degree of private quality information,which can reveal the equilibrium of mutual beneficial cooperation.(4)Quality incentive contract design for complex product supply chain concerning"profit-reputation".Concerning the system suppliers have the private quality information,"principle-agent" model is established for solving the equilibrium of is quality cooperation with the fixed payoff.Quality incentive measures such as sharing quality improvement cost and rewarding attractive quality are introduced to design quality incentive contract.Additionally,the role of quality incentive contract on participates' comprehensive utilization is explored as a programming model for analyzing cooperative equilibrium and the quality improvement,in which the optimal objective is minimizing the deviation between participates' optimal quality level and various constraints,such as utilization improvement,effectively courage and positive participation,is contained.(5)Case study:the quality cooperation of key outsourcing system for commercial aircraft C919.The "principle-agent" relationship between Comac and the system supplier is analyzed to define the process of quality transaction,main economic profits and cooperation cost.The attention between short-term economic profit and long-term quality reputation of Comac and the system supplier is investigated,which can test the rationality of the "profit-reputation" utility fuction.Therefore,a novel realization mechanism concerning "profit-reputation" utility function is developed as a framework to reveal the Pareto equilibrium allocated scheme between economic profit and quality reputation with fixed cost under asymmetric quality information.Last but not the least,the incentive measures about quality improvement of outsourcing system are designed,both shared quality improvement cost contract and quality incentive contract can increase the quality level of the outsourcing system,then realize the quality improvement.This thesis contribute to the quality cooperation and quality incentive of complex product supply chain under small batch order,which furnishes a fresh perspective on the supply chain quality management of a complex product.