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Study On Coopetition Of Enterprises From The Perspective Of The Game Theory

Posted on:2019-11-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J M HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330551956408Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the light of the problems behind the unstable cooperative relationship between third-party payment enterprises and commercial banks,this paper This paper aims at discussing the stability mechanism of the co-opetitive relationship between them from the perspective of micro-individuals.According to the game theory,the statement of this paper discusses the co-opetitive relationship between the two parties in two levels:In the first level,considering the individual's complete rationality,this paper discusses the non-cooperative static equilibrium mechanism between third-party payment enterprises and commercial banks;further introducing the discount factor,we examines the necessary conditions for the emergence of the cooperative equilibrium solution under the repeated game.In the second level,under the condition of bounded rationality,the evolutionary game model is used to further discuss the cooperation conditions and the stable mechanism of the co-opetition between the two parties in the process of long-term interaction.The research has the following conclusions.First,An infinite number of repeated games shows that there is a critical value of the discount factor for the two parties respectively,which are ?B*and ?C*.When the conditions that ?B??B*and ?C??C*are met,equilibrium solution appears.The evolutionary game shows that the probability that the third-party payment enterprises and commercial banks choose the cooperation strategy satisfies the condition of x*+ y*>1 and then the system will evolve to the mutual cooperation.Second,when the third-party payment enterprises and commercial banks can increase the distribution coefficient of cooperation benefits and reduce cooperation costs,cooperation risks and speculative gains under the assumption of complete rationality,both parties will tend to cooperate.Under the assumption of bounded rationality,the lower the distribution coefficient of cooperation benefits and cooperation costs,cooperation risks,speculative gains and potential losses,the faster the system evolves to the cooperative state a.At the same time,there exists an optimal profit distribution coefficient between third-party payment enterprises and commercial banks,which is ?*.?*also maximizes the willingness of both parties to cooperate.In reality,there is empirical evidence to support this hypothesis.
Keywords/Search Tags:Third-party payment enterprises, Commercial banks, Competition and cooperation, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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