| Since China's reform and opening up,the economy has developed rapidly,the total economic aggregate has been unprecedentedly strong,the country's strength has been further enhanced,and the mechanism for disclosure of accounting information by state-owned listed companies has gradually been on track.Although there are qualitative leaps in the development of state-owned enterprises,the accounting fraud cases often occur.Faced with such incidents,people often think that increasing the investigation efforts and giving heavy punishments to counterfeiters can prevent such violations and violations,but it turns out that this practice has not solved accounting fraud incidents.The related domestic and foreign documents to solve such problems are generally limited to the causes of fraud analysis and policy recommendations and the relevant model research is only a two-stage model.The accounting fraud incidents that have been continuously exposed in recent years show that such research does not solve the problems of the accounting supervision system itself.Under such a circumstance,this article expects to improve the existing two-phase model of accounting supervision,hoping to achieve a true dynamic balance.By referring to the relevant literature at home and abroad,this article studies the existing research results,and analyzes the regulatory problems in China's state-owned listed companies.It concludes that supervisory oversight is an important cause of accounting falsification.Therefore,this paper combines the game theory with the existing two-stage model to construct a three-stage accounting supervision model,so as to achieve a new balance of accounting supervision,and combines the research results to give specific recommendations and related safeguard measures.This article first elaborates the background and significance of the research,and reviews domestic and foreign scholars' related researches on accounting supervision and re-regulation.Then it introduces the related concepts and theories of game theory,and then combines the financial fraud cases of Shanxi state-owned company--Taiyuan Chemical Co.,Ltd.It deeply analyzes of the reasons for counterfeiting by Taiyuan Chemical Co.,Ltd.,and concludes that the failure of supervision by the Shanxi State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC)is the main reason for counterfeiting by Taiyuan Chemical Co.,Ltd.,and then further is verified by the game theory model.By constructing a game theory model,it is concluded that under different conditions of re-regulation,Shanxi Provincial SASAC and Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.have different options,not only to re-regulate Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.,but also to strengthen the re-regulation of Shanxi Provincial SASAC.Although the increase in supervision and punishment of Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.can reduce the incidents of accounting fraud in the short term,it is still necessary to strengthen the supervision and restriction of Shanxi Provincial SASAC in order to fundamentally eliminate the occurrence of accounting fraud,which is the fundamental way of supervision.In the end,this article analyzes the causes of counterfeiting by Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.and the results of model verification,and gives relevant suggestions for preventing financial falsification of Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.By strengthening the re-regulation of the Shanxi Provincial SASAC,improving the efficiency of re-regulation,and eliminating the occurrence of counterfeiting by Taiyuan Chemical co.,Ltd.,it is hoped that a truly dynamic and balanced state of supervision will be achieved,providing reference for the accounting supervision of state-owned listed companies in China. |
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