Research On The Impact Of Independent Directors Reputation Inspiration On The Quality Of Accounting Information Disclosure From A Multi-seat Perspective

Corporate governance has always been a topic of concern for researchers.The independent director system is recognized as one of the most effective systems for solving the problem of entrusted agency in corporate governance.Independent director reputation and incentives can effectively resolve the independence of independent directors in the external human capital market.The effective incentive method for the non-independence arising from the appointment of directors as the largest shareholder.However,there are certain controversies about the opinions on independent directors' reputation incentives.This paper attempts to study the impact of independent directors' reputation incentives on the quality of accounting information disclosure in corporate governance from a multi-seat perspective.The paper defines and measures the concepts of independent directors' reputation incentive and accounting information disclosure quality,and analyzes the independent director's reputation incentive based on principal-agent theory,incentive-constraint theory,and busy hypothesis theory.The relationship between the quality of accounting information disclosure and assumptions are proposed.Select the accounting information disclosure quality of listed companies on the Main Board of Shenzhen in 2012-2016,independent directors' reputation incentives,independent director diligence,etc.as research samplesThe empirical results show that the quality of accounting information disclosure is significantly positively correlated with the independence of independent directors,and the independent directors' diligence is significantly negatively correlated with the multi-seat independent directors' reputation incentives.The quality of accounting information disclosure is significantly negatively correlated with the multi-seat independent directors' reputation incentives,and is multi-seat.The influence of independent directors' reputation incentives on the quality of accounting information disclosure is partly due to the diligence of independent directors.This shows that multi-seat independent directors can hardly guarantee to invest the same amount of time and effort in each company they work for.The higher the reputation of multi-seat independent directors,the more unfavorable the quality of accounting information disclosure.Based on the analysis of empirical results make policy recommendations...